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ABSTRACT 
 
Mechanism Design for Distributed Task and Resource Allocation Among Self-Interested 
Agents in Virtual Organizations. (May 2006) 
Linli He, M.S., Southwest Petroleum Institute 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Thomas R. Ioerger 
The aggregate power of all resources on the Internet is enormous. The Internet can 
be viewed as a massive virtual organization that holds tremendous amounts of information 
and resources with different ownerships. However, little is known about how to run this 
organization efficiently. 
This dissertation studies the problems of distributed task and resource allocation 
among self-interested agents in virtual organizations. The developed solutions are not 
allocation mechanisms that can be imposed by a centralized designer, but decentralized 
interaction mechanisms that provide incentives to self-interested agents to behave 
cooperatively. These mechanisms also take computational tractability into consideration 
due to the inherent complexity of distributed task and resource allocation problems.  
Targeted allocation mechanisms can achieve global task allocation efficiency in a 
virtual organization and establish stable resource-sharing communities based on agents’ 
own decisions about whether or not to behave cooperatively. This high level goal requires 
solving the following problems: synthetic task allocation, decentralized coalition formation 
and automated multiparty negotiation. 
 iv
For synthetic task allocation, in which each task needs to be accomplished by a 
virtual team composed of self-interested agents from different real organizations, my 
approach is to formalize the synthetic task allocation problem as an algorithmic mechanism 
design optimization problem. I have developed two approximation mechanisms that I prove 
are incentive compatible for a synthetic task allocation problem.  
This dissertation also develops a decentralized coalition formation mechanism, 
which is based on explicit negotiation among self-interested agents. Each agent makes its 
own decisions about whether or not to join a candidate coalition. The resulting coalitions 
are stable in the core in terms of coalition rationality. I have applied this mechanism to 
form resource sharing coalitions in computational grids and buyer coalitions in electronic 
markets.  
The developed negotiation mechanism in the decentralized coalition formation 
mechanism realizes automated multilateral negotiation among self-interested agents who 
have symmetric authority (i.e., no mediator exists and agents are peers).  
In combination, the decentralized allocation mechanisms presented in this 
dissertation lay a foundation for realizing automated resource management in open and 
scalable virtual organizations. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
 
The main theme of this dissertation is to design decentralized mechanisms for 
distributed task and resource allocation among self-interested agents who are trying to 
maximize their own benefit without concern of the global good in a multiagent system. The 
developed mechanisms are targeted to establish virtual organizations through interactions 
among self-interested agents. Within such a virtual organization, self-interested agents must 
have incentives to behave cooperatively if global efficiency of distributed task and resource 
allocation is to be achieved without a centralized controller. 
 
MOTIVATION 
 
Distributed task and resource allocation have been fundamental research topics in 
distributed computer science (Zweben and Fox 1994; Clearwater 1996; Kraus and Plotkin 
2000). Multiple agents need to work together due to an inherent distribution of resources 
such as knowledge, capability, information, and expertise among the agents. Agents are 
often unable to accomplish their own tasks alone, or they might be able to accomplish tasks 
better when working with others (Weiss 1999). Traditionally, the designers of distributed 
task and resource allocation algorithms and protocols have made an implicit assumption 
 that the participating agents will act as instructed – except, perhaps, for faulty or malicious 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of Applied Artificial Intelligence. 
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ones (Nisan and Ronen 1999; Ronen 2000). The main concerns of designing distributed 
allocation algorithms are algorithmic complexity and communication load (network 
complexity). 
This assumption can no longer be taken for granted with the emergence of the 
Internet as the platform of computation. The aggregate power of all resources on the 
Internet is huge. Ideally, this aggregate power would be optimally and dynamically 
allocated online to appropriate users (Nisan and Ronen 1999; Ronen 2000). The resources 
on the Internet have many new features that do not exist in traditional computational 
platforms. Notably, the resources are heterogeneous with different ownerships, dynamic 
availability, and geographical dispersion. Thus, the Internet has the characteristics of an 
economy as well as those of a computational system (Feigenbaum et al. 2001; Feigenbaum 
and Shenker 2002). The majority of the participating agents are neither obedient nor 
adversarial, but rational or self-interested in the sense that each agent has its own goals and 
preferences. The decision for a self-interested agent to be cooperative is based upon 
whether the cooperation can bring greater benefit than working alone. They will not 
necessarily follow prescribed algorithms but will respond to punishments and incentives.  
Existing distributed task and resource allocation mechanisms typically have been 
constructed from the top down (Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994), namely, by imposing 
fixed allocation rules to handle all possible situations. This design philosophy does not 
work well in a computational platform like the Internet because there does not exist an 
omniscient designer who can develop a task and resource allocation mechanism that 
satisfies the preferences of all self-interested resource users and suppliers and maximizes 
the global efficiency. Instead, task and resource allocation mechanisms need to be 
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established from the bottom up (Clearwater 1996, Tesfatsion 2002), meaning that every 
participating agent makes individual decisions based on local knowledge and preferences 
(most likely with incomplete information about other agents) without considering the 
global efficiency. The global efficiency is generated from the bottom up through 
interactions among self-interested agents. A decentralized mechanism for a distributed 
allocation problem is indeed an interaction mechanism for self-interested agents who 
normally have incomplete information about others (Rosenschein and Zlotkin 1994). The 
objective of designing such an interaction mechanism is to establish a stable system where 
resources are shared through interactions among self-interested agents. Computational grids 
and Peer-to-Peer systems are typical examples of such a system. 
Interactions among self-interested agents have been studied intensively in game 
theory (Kahan and Rapoport 1984; Fudenberg and Tirole 1991; Osborne and Rubinstein 
1994). The focus of game theory is to analyze whether a given solution is stable in terms of 
the willingness of self-interested agents to behave cooperatively. Game theorists have 
developed a number of solution concepts such as dominant strategy, core, bargain set, 
Sharply value, Nash equilibrium, etc. to evaluate this stability. The preferred solution 
concept is dominant strategy, which means that each agent can maximize its own utility no 
matter what kind of strategies that other agents are using (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991; 
Osborne and Rubinstein 1994).  
Mechanism design is a sub-field of game theory that has focused on problems 
where the goal is to satisfactorily aggregate privately known preferences of several agents 
towards a “social choice” (Jackson 2001). In other words, it studies how “rules of a game” 
constrains the public behavior of the participating agents by providing proper incentives or 
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punishments. The desired mechanisms are incentive-compatible in the sense that the 
designed mechanisms can provide incentives to self-interested agents to behave 
cooperatively in a multiagent system.    
However, game theory does not provide actual methodologies to design such a 
mechanism.  For a decade, distributed artificial intelligence has been studying how to 
develop automated interaction mechanisms for self-interested agents in multi-agent systems 
(Rosenschein and Zlotkin 1994; Sandholm 1996; Parkes 2000). Game theory plays an 
irreplaceable role in providing a mathematic foundation to evaluate developed mechanisms. 
Researchers soon recognized that game theory downplays the complexity aspect of these 
mechanisms. Self-interested agents in game theory are assumed to be perfectly rational in 
the sense that the computational cost of rational reasoning is not taken into account 
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1991; Osborne and Rubinstein 1994). This assumption is invalid in 
the real world. There are many optimization allocation problems that are computationally 
intractable (Sandholm 1996). Yet, it has been proved that some approximation algorithms 
might cause a mechanism to be no longer incentive-compatible (Parkes 2000). Therefore, 
to solve distributed task and resource allocation problems among self-interested agents, 
incentive compatibility and computational tractability need to be jointly addressed. 
Researchers in distributed artificial intelligence have put a great deal of attention 
into developing theoretic models that consider incentive compatibility and computational 
tractability jointly. Established by Nisan and Ronen (1999), algorithmic mechanism design 
(AMD) is a formal model of centralized computation that combines incentive compatibility 
(the “mechanism design” part) with computational tractability (the “algorithmic” part). 
Feigenbaum et al. (2001) extended this model to distributed algorithmic mechanism design 
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(DAMD), in which the same goals of incentive compatibility and computational tractability 
are considered. In addition, the agents, the relevant information, and the computational 
model are all inherently distributed. Network complexity also needs to be taken into 
consideration. Sandholm and Lesser (1995, 1997) developed a domain-independent model 
for coalition formation in a situation where the rationality of self-interested agents is 
bounded by computational complexity. These theoretic models bring game theory and 
complexity theory together and provide tangible criteria for evaluating whether a 
mechanism is both incentive-compatible and computationally tractable. 
The focus of this dissertation is not to invent a new incentive-compatible and 
computationally tractable theoretic model, but to use the existing models (Rosenschein and 
Zlotkin 1994; Sandholm and Lesser 1997; Nisan and Ronen 1999; Papadimitriou 2001; 
Azoulay-Schwartz and Kraus 2004; Porter 2004) to analyze the mechanisms that I develop 
for solving distributed task and resource allocation problems that have a variety of 
applications in virtual organizations, grid and peer-to-peer computing and electronic 
commerce. This dissertation also focuses on designing decentralized mechanisms where a 
system-wide solution for a distributed allocation problem consists of agreements made by 
multiple participating agents. How to achieve those agreements in a distributed and 
dynamic environment is one of the major focuses of this dissertation.  
Negotiation is essential to achieving an agreement among self-interested agents 
(Kraus 2001). Social scientists have studied negotiation from many different perspectives 
(Raiffa 1982). Game theorists are interested in how self-interested agents divide the payoff 
of cooperation through negotiation (Raiffa 1982; Fudenberg and Tirole 1991; Osborne and 
Rubinstein 1994). Bargain theory (Harsanyi 1967, 1977) is a typical example. Researchers 
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in distributed artificial intelligence have put a great deal of effort into implementing 
automated negotiation among self-interested agents. Most previous studies focus on 
bilateral negotiation between two agents (Rosenschein and Zlotkin 1994; Jennings et al 
2001; Larson and Sandholm 2001). As for how to achieve an agreement among multiple 
agents, little work has been done. In this dissertation, implementing automated multiparty 
negotiation among self-interested autonomous agents is one of the most important methods 
for solving distributed allocation problems.  
 
EXAMPLE DISTRIBUTED TASK AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION SCENARIOS 
 
To address the motivation of this research from a practical perspective, the 
following section describes some example scenarios in real applications where the 
distributed task and resource allocation mechanisms developed in this dissertation are 
needed. The formal distributed allocation problems that this dissertation will address are 
abstracted from these real applications. 
 
Outsourcing/Virtual Teamwork 
 
As information and communication technologies overcome the constraints of time 
and distance, it becomes a necessary to create virtual organizations that consists of a 
temporary network of independent companies linked by IT infrastructure to share skills, 
costs, and access to one another's markets. One of the most important advantages of a 
virtual organization is executing synthetic tasks by forming temporary teams composed of 
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experts from different fields and independent organizations (which are most likely 
geographically dispersed) through the Internet.  
One typical example is to construct temporary offshore software development teams 
to accomplish multiple projects (Hatch 2005).  The problem is how to construct the most 
efficient offshore teams from various outsourcing service vendors to finish these projects as 
soon as possible. One of the major challenges of this problem is that the actual capabilities 
of software engineers from different outsourcing service vendors are private information 
that cannot be accessed directly from outside. The project manager has to construct virtual 
software development teams and allocate tasks based on the reported capabilities.  
 
 
Project 
Manager 
Group#1 Group#m 
Projects 
Group#j 
… … 
… … 
Project#i 
… … 
a1i aji ami 
FIGURE 1.1. Synthetic Task Allocation 
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Obviously, each vendor is self-interested in the sense that its goal is to maximize its 
own profit. Therefore, an incentive-compatible allocation mechanism is required to induce 
outsourcing service vendors to be willing to report the true capability of their software 
engineers.  
Suppose there is a project manager who has a number of projects at hand, and each 
project cannot be accomplished by only one of software engineers due to multiple skills 
required (e.g., one project might need a GUI engineer and a database designer working 
together). People with different expertise might belong to different groups that are self-
interested, and experts in one group might have different capabilities in terms of how 
efficient they are. How does the project manager determine the true capabilities of all the 
experts in different groups and compose a temporarily appropriate team for each project? 
Intuitively, a senior software engineer might be slowed down because of working with a 
junior graphic designer. Therefore, the problem becomes how does the project manager 
build efficient teams for synthetic tasks without knowing the true capabilities of agents in 
different groups so that he can accomplish all projects in the minimal amount of time? 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the synthetic task allocation problem considered in this 
dissertation. A set of projects needs to be done. Each of these projects requires cooperation 
among agents from different groups with different expertise. Within each group, different 
agents require different amounts of time to finish identical tasks. I use the capability model 
in (He and Ioerger 2003) to represent the capability differentiation among agents in each 
group. Without loss of generality, I assume that each project needs exactly one agent from 
each group. I call these kinds of projects synthetic tasks. The project manager needs to 
build a temporary team for each project. The amount of time required to finish a project 
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depends on the capability of the most inefficient member of that team. The objective of the 
project manager is to minimize the total amount of time required to accomplish all projects. 
As shown in Figure 1.1, the number of possible teams that need to be considered is 
n
m
 in the worst case, where m is the number of groups and n is the number of members in 
each group. In fact, even if there is only one group and agents are cooperative, the task 
allocation problem is NP-hard (Coffman et al. 1987). Complexity cannot be ignored in 
solving this synthetic task allocation problem. Therefore, an efficient synthetic task 
allocation mechanism is needed that is both incentive-compatible and computationally 
tractable. 
Indeed, the synthetic task allocation problem described above is essential to 
conducting efficient task allocation in a virtual organization. The Internet is becoming a 
large-scale virtual organization that holds a tremendous amount of information and 
resources with different owners. Little is known about how to run this organization 
efficiently. There does not exist a well-understood organizational structure that can model 
this system. In this system, allocating tasks to appropriate computational resources is 
analogous to allocating synthetic tasks to offshore teams. Computational tasks might need 
different resources from different resource owners on the Internet. Also, computational 
resources are most likely heterogeneous. Resources of the same type may have different 
capabilities (e.g. CPUs with different speeds). Incentive-compatible allocation mechanisms 
are required to induce resource owners to reveal the true capabilities of their computational 
resources. 
 
 10 
Resource Sharing in Computational Grids and Peer-to-Peer Systems 
 
Many scientific and commercial computational applications require increasingly 
powerful computational resources to satisfy computational performance requirements. 
Large amounts of computational resources connected via the Internet are idle most of the 
time. Utilizing these idle resources that are owned by different organizations or individuals 
and are geographically dispersed to satisfy intensive computational power requirements 
from numerous scientific and commercial applications has become a major goal of 
distributed computer science.  The emergent areas of grid computing and peer-to-peer 
computing are aimed at overcoming this challenge (Foster and Kesselman 1998; Buyya 
2002; Buyya et al. 2002; Milojicic et al. 2002; Berman et al. 2003). 
The recent developments in grid and peer-to-peer computing have positioned them 
as promising next-generation computing platforms. They enable the creation of virtual 
enterprises for sharing computational resources distributed across the world. Both of these 
two research areas in distributed computing are aimed at addressing the problem of 
organizing large-scale computational societies for resource sharing within virtual 
communities where resources may not be controlled by any single organization.  
The participating agents are inherently self-interested in computational grids and 
peer-to-peer systems. Providing incentives for those self-interested agents to participate in a 
computational grid or peer-to-peer system is a key to making these computational systems 
feasible. A basic assumption is that agents in a computational grid or a computational peer-
to-peer system have peak workloads at different times so that they can utilize others’ 
resources at idle times. That necessitates distributed load balancing (Lan et al. 2002; Shan 
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et al. 2003) among self-interested agents. Agents share their resources with their partners. 
The question is how to establish such partnerships? 
In current computational grids, community standards are represented via explicit 
policies (Foster and Iamnitchi 2003; Foster et al. 2004). Resources owned by various 
administrative organizations are shared under locally defined policies that specify what is 
shared, who is allowed to share, and under what conditions. Normally, a small number of 
sites are connected in collaborations engaged in complex scientific applications. As system 
scale increases, grid developers are now facing problems relating to autonomic 
configuration and management. How to automatically adjust system level policy to be 
adaptive to system updates (both hardware and software) and user requirement changes 
remains a major challenge in grid computing. As Foster and Iamnitchi (2003) pointed out: 
“Over all, scalable autonomic management remains a goal, not an accomplishment, for 
Grid computing.”  
The explicit grid policy implemented in the existing computational grids can be 
viewed as agreements achieved through negotiation among participating organizations. 
This dissertation proposes a resource sharing mechanism that is based on a distributed 
coalition formation mechanism through automated multiparty negotiation among self-
interested agents. This approach aims to establish resource management policies in 
computational grids autonomously and dynamically through automated negotiations among 
participating agents.  
 
 
 12 
Combinatorial Trade in Electronic Markets 
 
In electronic markets, the distance between producers, wholesalers, distributors, 
retailers, and consumers has practically disappeared (Ye and Tu 2003). There are many 
more choices faced by all parties involved in electronic combinatorial trade than in a 
traditional trade system. The relationship between suppliers and customers is under-going 
revolutionary change. 
Buyers vary a great deal in the quantity of goods they want to purchase, in customer 
service requirements, in income, in time constraints and in many other dimensions. 
Different purchasing goals can cause widely varying production and transaction costs. 
Suppliers have their own “buyer selection” strategies to achieve better profitability. Quickly 
differentiating the supplier’s marketing strategy based on the difference of purchasing goals 
among various buyers plays a key role in improving the sellers’ competitive capabilities in 
electronic markets (He and Ioerger 2004a, 2005a and 2005b).  
In traditional markets, it is impractical for buyers to build such purchasing strategies 
because of the expense of access to product information. However, in the age of electronic 
commerce, buyers can access product information easily and inexpensively. Small buyers 
with little or zero bargaining power in traditional markets now can build collaborative 
purchasing strategies to minimize their cost in electronic markets. A well-known example 
of building such a purchasing strategy for buyers is to form buyer coalitions (e.g., Buyer 
Club) to enlarge the total quantity of goods purchased in each transaction (Lerman an 
Shehory 2000; Yamamoto and Sycara 2001; Li and Sycara 2002). Buyers can obtain lower 
prices without buying more than their real need. If the buyers are heterogeneous in the 
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sense that they need to buy different goods in a combinatorial market, the mechanism is the 
so-called combinatorial coalition formation. 
Buyer coalition formation is a distributed combinatorial optimization problem, 
which is a highly non-trivial problem that needs to be solved by considering incentive 
compatibility and computational tractability jointly. In contrast to the previous work, this 
dissertation focuses on solving this problem in a pure decentralized manner, which is more 
realistic than solving the problem through a centralized mediator. I apply my distributed 
coalition formation mechanism that is based on automated multiparty negotiation. This 
approach allows agents to make their own decisions, and significantly reduces the 
computational complexity by distributing the computational costs among all participating 
agents.  
 
DISTRIBUTED METHODS FOR TASK AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
 
I have developed the following distributed methods for task allocation and resource 
sharing in virtual organizations. 
 
Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Synthetic Task Allocation  
 
In this dissertation, designing incentive-compatible mechanisms for synthetic task 
allocation (He and Ioerger 2005c) among self-interested agents is one of the major 
contributions. I develop both incentive-compatible and computationally intractable 
mechanisms for synthetic task allocation problems, in which each task needs to be 
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accomplished by a virtual team composed of self-interested agents from different real 
organizations.  I formalize the synthetic task allocation problem as an algorithmic 
mechanism design optimization problem. I have developed two incentive-compatible 
mechanisms for the synthetic task allocation problem. It shows that designing both 
incentive-compatible and computationally tractable mechanisms is feasible for synthetic 
task allocation problems in virtual organizations.   
 
Forming Resource Sharing Coalition through Multiparty Negotiation 
 
Another major contribution of this dissertation is that I develop a decentralized 
coalition formation mechanism, which is based on explicit negotiation among self-
interested agents (He and Ioerger 2004a, 2005a and 2005b). The developed coalition 
formation mechanism achieves decentralization through explicit negotiation among self-
interested agents. Each agent makes its own decisions on whether or not to join a possible 
coalition. The resulting coalitions are stable in the core in terms of coalition rationality.  
Compared with the centralized approaches, this mechanism significantly reduces the 
complexity of coalition formation processes. The communication load caused by 
negotiation is very low due to a properly designed multiparty negotiation protocol.  
The multiparty negotiation mechanism itself is unique because existing negotiation 
mechanisms in distributed artificial intelligence are bilateral. The developed negotiation 
mechanism extends the Monotonic Concession Protocol (Rosenschein and Zlotkin 1994) 
for negotiation between two agents and realizes automated multilateral negotiation among 
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self-interested agents who have symmetric authority (i.e., no mediator exists and agents are 
peers) in a multiagent system.  
I have applied this mechanism to form resource sharing coalitions in computational 
grids and buyer coalitions in electronic markets. The simulation results show that the 
coalition formation process is successful in the sense that automated multiparty negotiation 
processes can lead agents to find appropriate coalitions and a coalition formation process 
can end properly. The communication load is practical in the sense that the number of 
messages received by each agent is much less than the worst case. For buyer coalition 
formation, my distributed coalition formation mechanism can result in nearly optimal 
results. 
 
OVERVIEW OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This dissertation develops decentralized mechanisms for distributed task and 
resource allocation among self-interested agents in virtual organizations. These 
mechanisms are both incentive-compatible and computationally tractable. Based on these 
mechanisms, stable virtual organizations (or communities) can be established through 
interactions among self-interested agents without a centralized controller. These 
mechanisms are also easy to implement, so that they can be built in autonomous agent 
systems. This has the potential to dramatically change the current reality in which most 
resource management policies in virtual organizations (e.g. computational grids) are 
manually enforced. 
 
 16 
CHAPTER II 
RELATED WORK 
 
Many researchers in distributed artificial intelligence (Rosenschein and Zlotkin 
1994; Sandholm 1996, 2003; Parkes 2000) have reviewed related game-theoretic aspects in 
terms of incentive compatible issues in multiagent systems. This chapter mainly focuses on 
the related work that has been done in distributed artificial intelligence because I am 
interested in applying existing theoretic models to formalize distributed task and resource 
allocation problems for self-interested agents. The goal of this dissertation is to design 
mechanisms for distributed task and resource allocation among self-interested agents that 
can result in stable resource-sharing communities. This chapter reviews existing theoretic 
models that jointly address incentive compatibility and computational tractability and the 
methodologies for distributed task and resource allocation problems in distributed artificial 
intelligence.  
 
ALGORITHMIC MECHANISM DESIGN 
 
Established by Nisan and Ronen (1999), algorithmic mechanism design (AMD) is a 
formal model that considers both incentive compatibility (the “mechanism design” part) 
and computational tractability (the “algorithmic” part).  
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Mechanism Design 
 
A mechanism design problem has two components: the algorithmic output 
specification and descriptions of what kind of benefits the participating agents can obtain. 
These components are given as utility functions over the set of possible outputs. 
Definition 2.1: Mechanism Design Problem 
A mechanism design problem is given by an output specification and by a set of agents’ 
utilities. There is a collection of agents A = {a1, …, an}. Each agent ai has some private 
information termed as its type ti ∈ Ti. The output specification maps to a type vector t = (t1, 
…, tn). Each agent ai’s preferences are given by a real valued function: vi(o, ti) in terms of 
some common currency. If the mechanism’s output is o and the mechanism hands this 
agent pi units of this currency, then its utility will be ui =  pi + vi(o, ti) (termed quasi-linear 
utility). The agent aims to optimize this utility. 
Definition 2.2: Mechanism Design Optimization Problem 
This is a mechanism design problem where the output specification is given by a positive 
real valued objective function g(o, t) and a set of feasible output F. The objective is to find 
an output o ∈ F that optimizes g(o, t). 
A mechanism solves a given problem by assuring that the required output occurs 
even as agents choose their strategies so as to maximize their own utilities. The formal 
definition of a mechanism is given as the following: 
Definition 2.3: A Mechanism 
There is a collection of agents A = {a1, …, an}. The mechanism defines a family of 
strategies Si for each agent ai. The agent can choose any si ∈ Si. A mechanism m = (o, p) is 
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composed of two elements: An output function o = o(s1 … sn) and an n-tuple of payments 
p1(s1 … sn), …, pn(s1 … sn). A mechanism is poly-time computable if the output and 
payment functions are computable in polynomial time. 
 
The Revelation Principle 
 
Definition 2.4: Dominant Strategy 
A mechanism is an implementation of dominant strategies if for each agent ai and each type 
ti there exists a strategy si ∈ Si, termed as dominant strategy, such that for all possible 
strategies of the other agents a
-i (i.e. {A/ ai}), si maximizes agent ai’s utility. 
Definition 2.5: Truthful Implementation 
A mechanism is truthful if for each agent ai and all its ti, Si = Ti, i.e., its dominant strategy is 
to report its real type. 
Definition 2.6: Strongly Truthful Implementation 
A mechanism is a strongly truthful implementation if truth-telling is the only dominant 
strategy for agents. 
 
Vickrey-Groves-Clarke Mechanisms 
 
The most positive result in mechanism design is the generalized Vickrey-Groves-
Clarke (VGC) mechanism (Vickery 1961; Clarke 1971; Groves 1973). The VGC 
mechanism applies to mechanism design problems where the objective function is simply 
the sum of all agents’ valuations.  
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Definition 2.7: Utilitarian Functions 
A maximization mechanism design problem is called utilitarian if its objective function 
satisfies g(o, t) =  ∑i vi(o, ti). 
Definition 2.8: A VGC Mechanism 
A direct revelation mechanism m = (o(t), p(t)) belongs to the VGC family if  
• o(t) ∈ argmaxo∑ =
n
i ii
tov
1
),(
 
• )()),(()( iiij jji thttovtp −≠ +=∑  where pi(t) is the payment that agent ai obtains when 
the type vector is t, ∑ ≠ij jj ttov )),(( is the sum of values of all agents except agent ai 
when the type vector is t, hi() is an arbitrary function of t-i and t-i = (t1, … ti-1, ti+1, …, 
tn). A very important theorem of VGC mechanism has been proved by Groves (1973): 
Theorem 2.1: A VGC mechanism is truthful. 
Feigenbaum et al. (2001) extended this model to distributed algorithmic mechanism 
design (DAMD), in which the same goals of incentive compatibility and computational 
tractability are presented. In addition, the agents, the relevant information, and the 
computational model are all inherently distributed. Network complexity also needs to be 
considered. In Chapter III, I will study the synthetic task allocation problem by formalizing 
this problem as the algorithmic mechanism design optimization problem.  
 
COALITION FORMATION 
 
Sandholm (1996) probably did the most complete survey of literature related to the 
theory of coalition formation among self-interested agents in his dissertation. He points out 
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that coalition formation includes three activities. The first is coalition structure generation, 
that is, formation of coalitions by the agents such that agents within each coalition 
coordinate their activities. Mathematically, it means partitioning a given set of agents into 
disjoint coalitions.  
 
 
The partition is called a coalition structure. Different subsets have different values 
(e.g. due to cost savings, or synergies of capabilities), and the goal is to find a partition of 
the agents that maximizes this value (summed over each group). The second is solving the 
optimization problems within each coalition. In a task allocation problem, this decides how 
to distribute tasks among the member agents of a coalition. The third activity involves 
payoff division.  It deals with how to divide the gain of a coalition to its member agents. 
 
Agent1 Agent2 Agent3 Agent4 Agentn 
… 
Coalition Structure Generation  
Coalition1 Coalition2 Coalition3 
Solving the optimal problems within each coalition 
Payoff Division 
Payoff Division 
FIGURE 2.1. Activities in Centralized Coalition Formation 
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The stability of the coalition depends on whether each member agent agrees with the actual 
payoff division. These activities interact with each other. Figure 2.1 illustrates these three 
activities.  
The first two activities described above are difficult in terms of their complexities. 
Sandholm et al. (1999) has proved that the complexity of coalition structure generation is 
O(nn). Normally, most allocation optimization problems are NP-hard problems (Sandholm 
1996; Parkes 2000). Payoff division is also a hard problem in terms of its complexity. The 
stability of a coalition depends on whether the payoff division is incentive-compatible in 
the sense that each member agent will not obtain more benefit by leaving the coalition. 
Therefore, coalition formation also needs to be addressed by jointly considering incentive 
compatibility and computational tractability. 
 Game theory provides many solution concepts for evaluating the stability of a 
coalition (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991; Osborne and Rubinstein 1994) under the assumption 
that agents involved in coalition formation have perfect rationality (i.e., algorithms can find 
the optimal solution with zero computational cost), which is not realistic in the real world. 
Sandholm and Lesser (1997) extended coalition formation in game theory to a normative 
theory of coalitions in combinatorial domains based on a domain classification for bounded 
rational agents. 
Game theorists did not provide actual methods of forming coalitions in real 
applications. Researchers in distributed artificial intelligence have put a great deal of effort 
into developing feasible algorithms (Sandholm and Lesser 1997; Sen and Dutta 2000; 
Caillou et al. 2002; Li and Sycara 2002) for all three activities of coalition formation 
among self-interested agents. Most of these works take centralized approaches by 
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formalizing coalition formation as a set of optimization problems. Generally, a group leader 
is chosen for organizing the coalition formation process and is in charge of payoff division. 
It is unclear how to select such an unselfish leader who is fair and acts in each member’s 
and the group’s best interests. The computational intractability of the centralized 
approaches also makes these algorithms only applicable for a small number of agents. 
There are only a few works on coalition formation that adopt distributed 
approaches. Shehory and Kraus (1995, 1998) developed distributed any-time algorithms of 
forming coalitions for cooperative agents for task allocation problems. They proposed two 
additional distributed algorithms for coalition formation among self-interested agents in 
non-super-additive games (Shehory and Kraus 1999). A merging process of coalition 
configurations from all agents is required. Voting is suggested to be one of the possible 
decision-making methods. Lerman and Shehory (2000) developed a distributed buyer 
coalition formation mechanism for a large-scaled electronic market, where a buyer coalition 
may form when buyers encounter other buyers or existing coalitions randomly. 
This dissertation proposes a distributed coalition formation mechanism that is based 
on conducting explicit negotiation among self-interested agents. By “explicit”, I mean that 
there are clear procedures for either accepting or rejecting a proposed coalition. An 
automated multiparty negotiation protocol is developed for autonomous agents. This 
distributed coalition formation mechanism allows self-interested agents to make their own 
decision about whether or not to join a coalition. A coalition is formed if all members agree 
to join this coalition. All agents are symmetric in terms of their equal roles in a coalition 
formation process. There does not exist any group leader or matchmaker to mediate the 
coalition formation process. Each agent only knows its own benefits of joining a coalition, 
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which is private information that cannot be accessed by other agents directly. An agreement 
about forming a coalition is achieved by negotiation among participating agents. 
This decentralized approach to coalition formation is more realistic in practice than 
previous approaches. Coalitions in the real world are generally formed through explicit 
negotiation among multiple agents. Agents make their own decisions on whether or not to 
join a coalition. Most likely, agents have no complete information about other agents' 
preferences. My mechanism tries to capture these features in a coalition formation process 
among human agents. Furthermore, by letting agents make their own decisions, my 
mechanism removes two computationally intractable activities of coalition formation: 
coalition structure generation and payoff division. The ultimate objective of this research is 
to maximizing social welfare (optimal coalition structure) through providing appropriate 
incentive to agents so that their decisions on joining a coalition will lead to an optimal 
coalition structure under constraints that agents are self-interested and willing to maximize 
their own utilities. 
 
NEGOTIATION AMONG SELF-INTERESTED AGENTS 
 
Negotiation has been studied in many different disciplines such as politics, 
economics, business and public relations. Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994) pointed out that 
the world functions through interacting agents. Each person pursues his own goals through 
encounters with other people or machines. The process of negotiation takes place in both 
formal and informal contexts. It is part of our daily life. 
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The importance of studying negotiation is straightforward for designing 
decentralized mechanisms for distributed task and resource allocation problems 
(Rosenschein and Zlotkin 1994; Sandholm 1996; Kraus 2001; Jennings et al 2001). 
Negotiations are initialized when agents need to make agreements on how to allocate a 
shared resource, how to do distributed load balancing, how to exchange resources etc. In 
this dissertation, negotiation is used for coalition formation, namely, agents making 
agreements about whether or not to form a coalition through multiparty negotiation. 
 There are two main research issues on negotiation in multiagent systems. The first 
is how to develop practical negotiation strategies (Kraus 2001), i.e., what kind of strategies 
that agents should use to maximize their own good during a negotiation process. The 
second is to develop protocols that allow automated negotiation agents (Jennings et al 
2001) to negotiate with each other. Game theory tools (e.g., Nash equilibrium, dominant 
strategy etc.) are used to evaluate negotiation strategies and protocols. 
 
The Art and Science of Negotiation 
 
Although I mainly focus on introducing the related work on negotiation in 
multiagent systems, I do not want to ignore Raiffa’s book (1982) “The Art and Science of 
Negotiation”, which is probably the most popular reference book for research work on 
negotiation. "Art" means dealing with the human element. "Science" means those aspects 
of the negotiation process that are capable of being analyzed in a fairly structured manner. 
The book conveys an idea that the “zero-sum” way of thinking, according to which one side 
must lose if the other wins, often makes both sides worse off than they would be when 
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bargaining for joint mutual gains. Raiffa is mainly interested in determining which 
outcomes to negotiation are optimal for both parties. Much of his analysis is based on the 
premise that both parties will act in an ultimately rational manner and make decisions that 
will be optimal. These analyses may not be practical in negotiation among human subjects 
due to the assumption that the negotiation subjects are always rational (i.e., each subject 
always tries to maximize its own utility). I believe it is the main reason why the researchers 
in multiagent systems would like to borrow ideas from this book because autonomous 
agents can be built to be rational. As with most work in game theory, this book does not 
focus on developing actual negotiation strategies and protocols.  It instead analyzes existing 
cases.  
 
Rules of Encounter  
 
“Rules of Encounter: Designing Conventions for Automated Negotiation among 
Computers” is a very well-known book about negotiation among autonomous agents 
written by Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994), who are pioneers of introducing game theory to 
distributed artificial intelligence. The book presents the beginnings of the theory of 
designing interaction protocols among computers with different designers and owners by 
using game theory tools. It identifies three distinct domains (task oriented, state-oriented 
and world oriented domain) where negotiation is applicable and addresses different 
strategies for each domain.  
There are two main points that the book tries to make about designing negotiation 
strategies. The first is that by appropriately adjusting the rules of public behavior (rules of 
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the game) by which agents must interact, the private strategies of each agent will be 
influenced. This can ensure desirable global attributes for a distributed and heterogeneous 
system. The second is that the participating agents must agree on the rules of the game. 
This can result in stable interaction protocols. Game theory tools are mainly used to 
evaluate these two criteria. 
Throughout the book, only two-agent domains and encounters are analyzed. The 
book presents a famous two-agent negotiation protocol, which is called “Monotonic 
Concession Protocol” (MCP). In the MCP protocol, agents start by simultaneously 
proposing one deal from the space of possible deals. An agreement is reached if one of the 
agents matches what the other one asked for in terms of utility. My focus in this dissertation 
is to let multiple self-interested agents achieve agreements through a multiparty negotiation 
protocol, which extends the MCP protocol to multiple-agent domains. 
 
Strategic Negotiation in Multiagent Systems 
 
Kraus (2001) presented a strategic-negotiation model, which is based on 
Rubinstein’s model of alternating offers where agents exchange offers until they reach an 
agreement or until one of them opts out of the negotiation. The goal of developing this 
model is to resolve conflicts among agents by reaching agreements through negotiation. 
The applications of this model include the data allocation problem in information server, 
common resource allocation problem, task delegation within a team, and the pollution 
allocation problem. The objective of this strategic-negotiation model is to provide the 
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agents with ways to reach mutually beneficial agreements without delay. In this model, 
there are n agents who need to reach an agreement on a given issue.  
This dissertation embeds negotiation into coalition formation. Agents might be 
involved in multiple negotiation processes during a coalition formation process. An agent’s 
decision on whether or not to accept an offer may not only depend on the decisions of other 
members in a proposed coalition but also depend on the decisions of agents outside of the 
proposed coalition. 
 
Automated Negotiation 
 
Jennings et al. (2001) proposed a generic framework for classifying and viewing 
automated negotiations. This framework was then used to discuss and analyze the three 
main approaches that have been adopted to automated negotiation: game theoretic, heuristic 
and argumentation-based approaches. For each approach, a brief appraisal of its relative 
merits and drawbacks is presented. They pointed out that much research still needs to be 
performed in the area of automated negotiation. The aim of this work is not to develop 
actual automated negotiation strategies or protocols for particular domains. It analyzes 
existing automated negotiation implementation.  
 
Other Work Related to Negotiation in Multiagent Systems 
 
Negotiation has been studied in distributed artificial intelligence both in distributed 
problem solving (DPS) where agents are cooperative and in Multiagent Systems (MAS) 
 28 
where agents are self-interested. Negotiation is used in DPS for solving conflicts, 
distributed planning and distributed search (O’Hare and Jennings 1996). This dissertation 
does not focus on cooperative agents.  
Sycara (1987, 1990) developed a model of negotiation that combines case-based 
reasoning and optimization of multi-attribute utilities. Zeng and Sycara (1998) embedded 
learning into negotiation. Agents can learn from previous encounters about their opponents’ 
negotiation strategies so that they choose corresponding strategies to influence their 
opponents or to obtain a better deal. Sierra et al. (1997) presented a model of negotiation 
for autonomous agents, which is distilled from intuitions about good behavioral practice in 
human negotiation. Sandholm and Lesser (2002) explored issues such as levels of 
commitment that arise in automated contract among self-interested agents whose rationality 
is bounded by computational complexity. I will discuss about their research more in the 
related work about distributed task and resource allocation. 
 
DISTRIBUTED TASK AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN MULTIAGENT 
SYSTEMS 
 
Distributed task and resource allocation is a central theme of distributed computer 
science (Clearwater 1996). I do not address the allocation issues of distributed computer 
systems when those systems have been centrally designed to pursue a single global goal 
such as a distributed operating system. I am interested in cooperative task allocation and 
resource sharing problems in systems that are established through interactions among 
multiple self-interested agents that are developed by different designers and belong to 
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different owners. This type of allocation problems has a variety of applications in grid and 
peer-to-peer computing, electronic commerce and virtual organizations.  
 
Contract Net and Levels of Commitment  
 
The most influential distributed task allocation mechanism in distributed artificial 
intelligence is the Contract Net protocol (Davis and Smith, 1983), which can be used for 
both cooperative agents and self-interested agents. The basic idea is that a task manager 
auctions a group of tasks, agents bid on these tasks based on their local marginal cost 
calculations. The original Contract Net does not take computational tractability into 
consideration, even though the marginal cost calculation for combinatorial problems are 
most likely intractable. Sandholm and Lesser (2002) extended the Contract Net protocol to 
allow it to work among self-interested computationally limited agents. Agents can 
reallocate tasks to each other for dynamically constructed charges. As a result, a more 
profitable global task allocation is reached than the initial one, while not executing a 
centralized task allocation algorithm. 
This dissertation studies the distributed synthetic task allocation problem. A 
synthetic task must be accomplished by an agent team, which is composed of self-interested 
agents from different organizations.  The objective to minimize the completion time of a set 
of synthetic tasks even though the true capabilities of agents are not known by the task 
allocation mechanism.    
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Methods for Task Allocation via Agent Coalition Formation 
 
As mentioned before, Shahory and Kraus (1995, 1998) developed distributed any-
time algorithms for forming coalitions among cooperative agents for task allocation 
problems. They considered situations where it is necessary to execute a task by a group of 
agents because it is more efficient or a single agent is not able to perform the task. The 
objective of this work is to improve the efficiency by allocating tasks to cooperative agent 
coalitions, which are formed through distributed algorithms. There is not an explicit 
negotiation protocol among agents. Each agent calculates the costs of coalitions it involves 
by itself and joins the coalition with the lowest cost for a certain task. The procedure is 
executed iteratively until there are no more tasks or no existing coalition is beneficial. 
This dissertation addresses distributed task and resource allocation among self-
interested agents. By forming resource sharing coalitions, agents with both tasks and 
resources can improve the efficiency of task execution (e.g. reduce task execution time) 
without increasing the amount of resources owned by each agent individually. The 
coalitions are formed through explicit negotiation among multiple agents. 
 
Auction and Market Based Resource Allocation Mechanisms 
 
Auctions and markets represent two ends of a spectrum of market formulations 
(Wolski et al 2001, 2003). On the market end, an attempt is made to satisfy all bidders and 
sellers at a given price. At the auction end, one bidder and seller is satisfied at a given price.  
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Market based resource allocation mechanisms are decentralized and no direct 
communication is needed. The balance between supply and demand decides the actual 
resource allocation. When the supply and demand for a certain resource reaches 
equilibrium, the price becomes stable.  How long it will take to reach equilibrium is 
normally unpredictable. Hence, price setting is a big obstacle for developing a market based 
resource allocation mechanism (Wolski et al 2001, 2003). 
An auction (Krishna 2002) is the simplest resource allocation mechanism for self-
interested agents in terms of its implementation. Auction-based distributed resource 
allocation mechanisms have been successful in many real distributed allocation 
applications.  The most positive result about auction is that the second sealed price auction 
belongs to VGC family and is a truthful implementation. Also, an auction has no problem 
with price setting. The bad news about auctions is that deciding the winner of a 
combinatory auction is a computationally intractable problem, but the distributed allocation 
problems in this dissertation are all combinatory optimization problems.  
These two types of allocation mechanisms are basically monetary approaches 
(Buyya et al. 2002). When computational resource allocation among self-interested agents 
is considered, agents do not explicitly buy others’ resources but use them when they are 
idle. It is very hard for agents to decide whether they should buy the time slots of using a 
resource or buy the resource itself. 
This dissertation focuses on bartering approaches (He and Ioerger 2005b) for 
developing computational resource allocation mechanisms. The idea is to let agents 
exchange their idle time slots of their computational resources. 
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CHAPTER III 
SYNTHETIC TASK ALLOCATION IN VIRTUAL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
In traditional computational organization models, the designers of task allocation 
mechanisms generally make an implicit assumption that organizational agents will report 
their true capabilities for achieving certain tasks. This assumption might not be true for 
virtual organizations. Organizational agents with self-interests are typical in virtual 
organizations. Incentive-compatible task allocation mechanisms must be designed for 
synthetic task allocation in virtual organizations. In this chapter, I study a synthetic task 
allocation problem by formalizing this problem as an algorithmic mechanism design 
optimization problem (Nisan and Ronen 1999). 
 
SYNTHETIC TASK ALLOCATION 
 
Recalling the synthetic task allocation problem illustrated in Figure 1.1, a number of 
tasks need to be done. Each of these tasks requires cooperation among different groups, 
which belong to different organizations. Members in different groups have different 
expertise. Within each group, all members have the same specialty, but they have different 
capabilities in the sense that different members might require different amounts of time to 
finish an identical task (or with a different quality, accuracy etc.). A member in a group is 
referred as an agent. A task needs to be done by a team that is composed of agents from 
different groups. It is assumed that there is no dependency among tasks and that tasks can 
be executed in parallel. 
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 It is assumed that each task needs exactly one agent from each group. These kinds 
of projects are referred as synthetic tasks. The project manager needs to build a temporary 
team for each task. The amount of time required to finish a task depends on the capabilities 
of members in that team. The objective of the project manager is to minimize the total 
amount of time required to accomplish all tasks. Definition 3.1 gives the formal definition 
of synthetic tasks. 
Definition 3.1: Synthetic Task 
A task, t, is called a synthetic task if t requires a set of activities X = { x1, …, xm }. Each of 
these activities needs to be performed by an agent with special skills. The synthetic task t, 
needs to be executed by an agent team, T, composed of m agents. Each of these agents is 
only able to perform one of the activities in X. Different agents in T differ in the activities 
that they can perform. 
A typical example of a synthetic task is a software development project that needs 
to be accomplished by a software development team. For instance, to build such a 
development team, a software project manager might need to have a software architect, a 
database administrator, a networking administrator and a few software developers who are 
good at different programming languages. These experts might actually belong to different 
groups in an organization. How to allocate the project to the most efficient team to 
accomplish the project is a big challenge.  
Before formally defining the synthetic task allocation problem, I need to define how 
efficient an individual agent is for executing a single activity (which needs to be done by 
only one agent) and how efficient an agent team is for executing a synthetic task (which 
needs to be done by a team of agents with different specialties). Here, I only consider the 
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amount of time required to finish a task as the evaluation criterion1 for both individual and 
team efficiency.  Greater efficiency means less time required to finish a task.    
The concept of individual efficiency is used to distinguish the different capabilities 
of agents in one group. They have the same specialty, but they differ in their efficiencies in 
the sense that they need different amounts of time to finish the same single activity. 
Definition 3.2: Individual Efficiency 
Individual efficiency is defined as a function fI(ai, x): I × Ω → +ℜ  , where  I is a set of 
agents and Ω is a set of activities. For ∀  ai ∈I, it can accomplish an activity x ∈  Ω. The 
value of fI(ai, x) is equal to the amount of time required by agent ai to finish a single activity 
x. Given a set G = {a1, …, an} of n agents and a single activity x, an agent ai is individually 
more efficient than aj if fI(ai, x) < fI(aj, x).  
My goal is to design a reward mechanism that will get a distributed group of self-
interested agents to automatically solve the synthetic task allocation problem. Individual 
efficiency has a strong effect on team efficiency. Besides individual efficiency, the amount 
of time that the team needs to finish the task might be also affected by some other factors 
such as how often these agents work together and how good these agents are at teamwork. 
If only individual efficiency is known, it is still unclear how to evaluate how efficient an 
agent team is. Therefore, I define the following concept of team efficiency to distinguish 
the different capabilities of agent teams, which are composed of agents from different 
                                                 
1
 To evaluate the efficiency of an individual agent or an agent team, the performance quality of accomplishing 
a task can be another criterion, such as cost or accuracy. However, higher quality performance usually 
requires more time. Here, assume the performance criteria for each task is the same. More efficient agents or 
agent teams spend less time to achieve the quality requirement than less efficient agents or agent teams. 
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groups. The composed teams differ in their efficiencies in the sense that they need different 
amounts of time to finish a same synthetic task.  
Definition 3.3: Team Efficiency 
Team efficiency is defined as a function fT(Ti, y): V × Φ → +ℜ , where V is a set of agent 
teams and Φ is a set of synthetic tasks. For ∀  Ti ∈V, Ti = (ai1, …, aim) is an agent team. 
For ∀  y ∈  Φ,  y requires a set of activities X = { x1, …, xm }.  aij in Ti is able to perform 
activity xj. The value of fT(Ti, y) is equal to the amount of time required by agent team, (ai1, 
…, aim), to finish synthetic task y.  Let G1, …, Gm denote m groups of agents and  y ∈  Φ 
denote a synthetic task. Agents in group Gj are able to perform activity xj. Synthetic task y 
needs to be accomplished by a team composed of m agents. Agent team (ai1, …, aim) is 
more efficient than agent team (aj1, …, ajm) if fT(Ti, y) < fT(Tj, y). 
Now, how does individual efficiencies affect team efficiencies? Currently, I assume 
that the efficiency of a team composed of more efficient agents is not worse than the 
efficiency of a team composed of less efficient agents. This kind of teamwork is defined as 
monotonic teamwork.   
Definition 3.4: Monotonic Teamwork 
Given a set G = {G1, …, Gm} of m groups of agents and a synthetic task, y, y needs to be 
accomplished by a team composed of m agents and different agents in a team are from 
different groups in G.  For any two teams A1 and A2 that differ by only one agent, i.e., A1\ 
A2 = {aj1} and A2\ A1 = {aj2}, where aj1 and aj2 to the same group Gj (meaning that aj1 and 
aj2 can do the same type of single task x), agent teamwork is monotonic teamwork iff  fT(A1, 
y) ≥  fT(A2, y) when  fI(aj1, x) ≥  fI(aj2, x). 
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In many real applications, the most inefficient team member may slow down the 
efficiency of the whole team significantly. For example, if a software development team 
has an inefficient network administrator, the efficiency of the network administrator might 
determine the whole team efficiency. If the network administrator cannot recover the 
computer network from some disaster events on time, the other team members may not be 
able to do any of their jobs. Let’s consider another assumption: for the most efficient team, 
if one agent is replaced by the second most efficient agent in the corresponding group, the 
efficiency of the team is immediately decreased to the same level of the team in which 
every member is the second most efficient team from each group. The same rule applies to 
the transformation from the second most efficient team to the third one, and so on. This 
type of teamwork is defined as strongly monotonic teamwork.  
Definition 3.5: Strongly Monotonic Teamwork 
Given a set G = {G1, …, Gm} of m groups of agents and a synthetic task, y, y needs to be 
accomplished by a team composed of m agents and different agents in a team are from 
different groups in G. Assume that each group has n agents and the agents in any group Gj 
are ordered by efficiency for any given activity x: fI(aj1, x) ≤ fI(aj2, x) ≤ … ≤ fI(ajn, x).  Let Ai 
denote the agent team (a1i, …, ami) and Ak denote that agent team (a1k, …, amk). Let 'iA  
denotes an agent team in which m-1 members are the same as Ai except for one member 
from Ak and i < k. Agent teams are strongly monotonic teamwork iff fT(Ai, y) ≥  fT(Ak, y)  
and fT( 'iA , y) =  fT(Ak, y)  . 
Based upon the concept of team efficiency, the synthetic task allocation problem is 
defined as follows: 
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Definition 3.6: Synthetic Task Allocation Problem 
The synthetic task allocation problem is denoted by a tuple QSTA  = <Φ, G , fT>, where Φ is 
a set of synthetic task { t1, …, tk }; G is a set of agent groups {G1, …, Gm}; and fT is the 
team efficiency function for tasks in Φ. Within a group Gj, there are n agents {aj1, …, ajn}, 
who have the same specialty but with different capabilities. Namely, they can accomplish 
the same activity in different amounts of time. To accomplish a synthetic task ti, a team 
composed of a1i, …, aji, …, ami is required. There is no pair in these m agents from the 
same group in G. Assume that every synthetic task in Φ needs to be accomplished by a 
team composed of m agents2 and each task is independent from other tasks in Φ. The 
amount of time di required to finish task ti is a function of vector Ai = (a1i, …, aji, …, ami): 
di = fT(Ai; ti). Furthermore, if an agent has been allocated to a team for a certain task, it 
cannot start a new task before the whole task has been finished. The objective of this 
problem (where agents are assumed to be implicitly cooperative, not self-interested, and all 
individual capabilities are known) is to minimize the total amount of time for finishing all 
tasks (makespan). The designed allocation algorithm for this problem can be represented as 
follows: 
• A feasible output of the allocation algorithm is a set of agent vectors A = {A1, .., Ak} 
where synthetic task ti is assigned to Ai.  
• Without loss of generality, assume that each group has the same size of n. Then, the 
total number of possible teams is nm, but there are only n teams that can exist in 
parallel. Assume that the total number of tasks is much larger than the size of each 
                                                 
2
 This assumption requires that all synthetic tasks in Φ are the same type of task in the sense that these tasks 
need to be finished by an agent team composed of m different experts. 
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group, i.e., k >> n3. Since there are only n teams that can exist in parallel, each agent in 
a group Gj might be needed to participate in executing multiple tasks.  Hence, from the 
view of group Gj, an output of the allocation algorithm results a task partition Xj = (xj1, 
…, xjn). Agent ajr will participant in tasks in xjr. Xj is the function of the allocation 
output A: Xj = Xj(A). Agents of group xj can execute their tasks in parallel. 
• The objective of the allocation algorithm is to minimize TE(A, Φ), which is the total 
completion time of all synthetic tasks in Φ. The objective function can be as: 
TE(A, Φ) = ));((maxmax ∑ ∈ jrxl llTrj tAf  
where j is the index of a group, r is the index of an agent in group Gj, and l is the index 
of a task in a task subset, xjr, in which agent ajr participates. );(∑ ∈ jrxl llT tAf  is the total 
amount of time that agent ajr (who belongs to group Gj) has to spend on participating in 
executing tasks in  xjr. The amount of time that agent ajr needs is equal to the amount of 
time that tasks in xjr need to be finished because agent ajr cannot start to participating in 
another new task until its current task has been finished. From the view of group Gj, all 
n agents in Gj execute task subsets in Xj in parallel. Since the task allocation process is 
offline, there is no idle time for each agent between any two tasks in which it 
participates4. Therefore, the maximum amount of time that an agent participates in the 
                                                 
3
 This assumption makes the synthetic task allocation problem nontrivial. If k=1, the allocation problem is 
trivial because the project manager only needs to allocate this task to the most efficient agent team. 
4
 Proof: Since no team member can quit from a task execution, after a task ends, all involved agents are free 
for other tasks. The scheduling process is offline. The project manager can construct proper teams before the 
scheduling. Since all tasks are the same type and independent, the project manager can build fixed n teams 
that are the best combinations based on the reported types. Then, the project manager schedules all tasks to 
proper teams. In other words, during the scheduling, the project manager does not reshuffle teams. As a result, 
there is no idle time for each agent between any two tasks in which it participates. 
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whole task execution process can be used to represent the minimum amount of time for 
completing all tasks in Φ.  
If agents in each group have the same capability, which is known by an allocation 
algorithm in advance, the synthetic task allocation problem would be equivalent to the 
Makespan problem (Coffman et al. 1987), which is how to minimize the completion time 
of a set of single tasks by scheduling them to multiple processors with the same capacity. 
The Makespan problem is a well-known NP-hard problem (Chen 2004).  
Lemma 3.1: The synthetic task allocation is an NP-hard problem. 
Proof: Even though the total number of possible teams is nm in the synthetic task allocation, 
there are only n teams than can exist in parallel because any agent cannot join two teams at 
the same time. Therefore, the synthetic task allocation problem can be simplified to be the 
Makespan problem if the capabilities of all agents in each group are the same and known by 
the allocation mechanism in advance. The mechanism only needs to allocate k tasks to n 
teams with the same capability and tries to minimize the completion time of those k tasks. 
The NP-hard Makespan problem (Garey and Johnson 1979) is polynomial reducible to the 
synthetic task allocation problem. The Makespan problem is defined as follows (Chen 
2004): given the set of tuples T = {c1, …, cn; m}, where ci is the processing time for the ith 
job and m is the number of identical processors. Can {c1, …, cn} be partitioned into m 
subsets, P1, …, Pm, such that the processing time of the largest subset can be minimized? 
Given an instance T = {c1, …, cn; m} of the Makespan problem, an instance α  = < 
Φ, G , fT> for the synthetic task allocation problem can be constructed. There are n tasks in 
Φ  = {t1, …, tn } and only one group G of m agents (a1, …, am). Each task in Φ needs to be 
executed by one agent in G. For task ti, the amount of time, ci, is calculated by function fT. 
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Therefore, T is a yes-instance for the Makespan problem if and only if an optimal solution 
to the instance α of the synthetic task allocation problem is minimizing the maximum 
amount of time that an agent in G participates in executing tasks assigned to the agent.  
There exist efficient approximation algorithms for the Makespan problem that can 
be extended to solve the synthetic task allocation problem. For example, Coffman et al. 
(1987) developed a 2-approximation algorithm for the Makespan problem. I extend it to a 
2-approximation algorithm for the synthetic task allocation problem if the teamwork among 
different groups is strongly monotonic. 
 
SYNTHETIC TASK ALLOCATION FOR SELF-INTERESTED AGENTS 
 
If the project manager knows the capabilities of agents in each group in advance, he 
can build a proper agent team for each task. The synthetic task allocation problem can be 
solved as a Makespan problem (Chen 2004). We only need to consider the issue of 
complexity (e.g., use an approximation algorithm for efficiency). However, in virtual 
organizations, the project manager most likely does not know the true capability of agents 
in each group in advance. Each agent group belongs to different real organizations. How to 
give each group incentive to report the true capabilities of their agents also needs to be 
considered.  
Intuitively, if the project manager would pay each team in proportion to its 
efficiency, each group might have incentive to send its most efficient agent to assigned 
tasks. However, this policy gives each group incentive to lie about the efficiencies of its 
agents because reporting higher efficiency than the real efficiency can bring better payment 
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for each group. Therefore, the project manager needs to have a better payment policy to 
induce each group to always tell the truth. 
My approach is to extend the synthetic task allocation problem as an algorithm 
mechanism design problem (AMD) (Nisan and Ronen 1999). The idea is to give each 
group incentives to report the true capabilities of their agents by providing appropriate 
payments. 
 
EXTENDING SYNTHETIC TASK ALLOCATION TO AN AMD PROBLEM 
 
Assume that all members in one group are cooperative in the sense that all members 
want to maximize the benefit of the group. The self-interested entities in the synthetic task 
allocation domain do not refer to group members but to groups. Each group is self-
interested in the sense that its goal is to maximize its own utility. For example, a law firm 
that has lawyers to outsource and a CPA firm with accountants for hire. Typically, there is 
no communication between groups. Each group does not know about other groups’ 
strategies and states. I also assume that the project manager does not know the true 
capability of each agent in a group. He builds a team for each synthetic task by using 
available agents as reported by agent groups. The only way that the project manger can 
affect the truth-telling of each group is by giving an appropriate amount of payment to each 
group. I extend synthetic task allocation to the following algorithmic mechanism design 
optimization (AMDO) problem: 
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Definition 3.7: Synthetic Task Allocation AMDO Problem 
The synthetic task allocation AMDO problem is denoted by a tuple QSTA-AMDO = < Φ, G , 
fT(T), PMAX>, where Φ, G , fT(T) are the same as the synthetic task allocation problem 
(Definition 3.5). PMAX is the total reward available that can be distributed among the groups 
for tasks accomplished. The objective of this problem is to design a payment policy that 
will cause each self-interested group to report the true capabilities of its agents (assuming 
each group is rational). Then the project manager can use an algorithm for the synthetic 
task allocation problem (definition 3.5) to minimize the total amount of time for finishing 
all tasks in Φ (makespan).  
The synthetic task allocation problem can be extended as the following algorithmic 
mechanism design optimization problem: 
• The objective of the synthetic task allocation algorithmic mechanism design 
optimization problem is to search for an optimal payment policy π* in a payment policy 
space such that each group has incentive to reveal the true capabilities of its agents. Let 
π denote a payment policy that maps a feasible synthetic task allocation A to a set of 
payment vectors, {p1, …, pm}. pj is the payment vector, (pj1, …, pjk), of group Gj for 
tasks in Φ. pji is the payment that group Gj obtains by sending an agent to execute task 
ti. In real applications, a payment function must satisfy that the sum of the payments of 
all agents in a team for a certain synthetic task must be less than or equal to PMAX, 
which is the maximum payment that a project manager can afford for all synthetic 
tasks. 
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• pji is the payment group Gj can obtain from sending agent aji to participate executing 
task ti. pji can be defined as a function f(ti, aji, PMAX). 
• The utility of group Gj is the sum of pay for all tasks its agents help accomplishing 
uj(A) = ji
k
i
p∑
=1  
The objective of group Gj is to maximize uj(A) (i.e. group Gj is assumed to be rational.) 
Solving this problem requires building proper teams for all synthetic tasks and to 
schedule tasks for those teams. There are totally nm possible teams. In the worst case, the 
complexity could be O(nm). In order to give each group incentive to report the true 
capabilities of their agents, I need to develop an algorithm for calculating payments for 
possible teams for each task.  
 
INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE SYNTHETIC TASK ALLOCATION 
 
In this section, I present my incentive-compatible mechanisms for the above 
synthetic task allocation AMD problem. The incentive compatible mechanism is the one 
that gives each group the proper amount of payment that can induce each group to report 
the true capabilities of its agents so that the group can maximize its utility.  Assume that 
teamwork is monotonic teamwork (see Definition 3.4). This assumption results in the 
following heuristic: picking the most efficient agent from every group and putting them in 
one team will create the most efficient or the fastest team. If the efficiency of a team 
depends on the most inefficient team member, then having the most efficient agents from 
some groups cannot improve the efficiency of a team within which there are some 
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inefficient agents from other groups. Based on this assumption, I propose the following 
MinTeamwork Mechanism. 
 
MinTeamwork Mechanism 
 
Based upon this assumption, a simple approximation mechanism for the synthetic 
task allocation problem can be developed similar to the MinWork mechanism that was 
described by Nisan and Ronen (1999) for the single task scheduling problem. Since I am 
dealing with synthetic tasks, I call it the MinTeamwork mechanism. 
MinTeamwork Mechanism 
• Allocation algorithm: Task ti is allocated to the most efficient team that can finish task 
ti with minimum amount of time. 
• Payment policy: By participating in executing task ti, group Gj can receive payment 
Pji(A) ));();((min * iiTiiTAA tAftAfc Ii −= ∈ such that *ii AA ≠ , 
where  );(min);( * iiTAAiiT tAftAf Ii ∈= and AI is the set of all possible agent team for 
task ti; c is the factor that maps time to payment unit of PMAX and 
));();(min( ** ∑∑ −
=
≠ i iiTiiTAAi
MAX
tAftAfm
P
c
ii
. In other words, for each task, the 
payment is proportional to the value that is equal to the amount of time that the second 
most efficient team requires to finish this task minus the optimal execution time of task 
ti.  
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The MinTeamwork mechanism lets each team member receive the same amount of 
payment for executing a task because the corresponding synthetic task cannot be finished if 
lacking any of the team members. 
Theorem 3.1: The MinTeamwork mechanism is truthful for the synthetic task allocation 
problem. 
Proof: I can show that truth-telling is the only dominant strategy. Since the synthetic tasks 
are assumed to be independent, I only need to show the case of one synthetic task, y (Varian 
1995; Nisan and Ronen 1999). Consider the case where there are only two groups of 
agents, G1 and G2. Let A denote the most efficient team and A’ denote the second most 
efficient team for the given task y according to the reported capabilities of group G1 and G2. 
For group G1, its utility is  
);();'( yAfyAfU TTj −= , 
where );( yAfT  refers to the amount of time that A needs to finish the given task and 
);'( yAfT
 refers to the amount of time that A’ needs to finish task y. The problem is that G1 
does not know G2‘s capabilities, so it cannot directly evaluate );'( yAfT or Uj. Hence it 
must make a decision based on the possible values of );'( yAfT . 
If );'();( yAfyAf TT < , group G1 wants to make the difference between );'( yAfT and 
);( yAfT as large as possible. Making );( yAfT  as small as possible is the best way to 
maximize Uj. Therefore, the best strategy of group G1 is to tell its true type, which is its 
most efficient agent for this task.  
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If );'();( yAfyAf TT > , then group G1 wants to make the difference between 
);'( yAfT and );( yAfT as small as possible. Making );( yAfT  as small as possible is the 
best way to maximize Uj. Again, the best strategy for group G1 is to tell its true type.       
Theorem 3.2: For the synthetic task allocation problem, MinTeamwork is an n-
approximation mechanism. 
Proof: Let Aopt denote the optimal allocation.  The following statements are true: 
TE(A, Φ) ∑
=
≤ k
i iiT
tAf
1
* );(  
and  TE(Aopt, Φ) ∑ =≥
k
i iiT
tAf
n 1
* );(1
. 
n is the total number of teams that can exist in parallel. In other words, all tasks are 
executed sequentially by the most efficient team. Since there can be n teams existing in 
parallel, in the worst case, these n teams have the same efficiency, the MinTeamwork 
mechanism needs n times of the optimal amount of time to complete all tasks.  
TE(A, Φ) ≤ n TE(Aopt, Φ) 
Therefore, the MinTeamwork mecanism is an n-approximation.  
 
MinCompletion Mechanism 
 
Since the MinTeamwork mechanism needs to pay the most efficient team with the 
payment that is based on the performance of the second most efficient team and the 
teamwork is assumed to be monotonic teamwork, then the complexity could be O(2m) in 
the worst case. The reason is that all possible teams composed of team members who are 
the first and second most efficient agents in each group should be considered. 
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The MinTeamwork is not a poly-time computable mechanism because it needs to 
find out the second most efficient team for each task in order to calculate the payment for 
each task.  Also, n-approximation is not a very good allocation algorithm. This mechanism 
just allocates all tasks to the most efficient team that includes the most efficient agent from 
each group. Other agents in each group are idle.  
In many real applications, no group would be happy if only its most efficient agent 
is working and others are idle. There is a more realistic payment function for group Gj in G 
as follows: 
Pj(A) = ));((max' 1 ∑ ∈=− jrxl llT
n
r tAfc
 
Namely, group Gj in G values the execution of all tasks by the makespan as the shorter the 
better. This means that all groups have the same objective as the project manager. If the 
teamwork is strongly monotonic teamwork, there is another new mechanism for this special 
case: 
MinCompletion Mechanism 
• Allocation algorithm: Task ti is allocated to the currently most efficient team that can 
finish task ti with minimum completion time (completion time is equal to the duration 
from the starting time of the first task to the finishing time of task ti). 
• Payment policy: The payment of group Gj is equal to  
Pj(A) = ));((max' 1 ∑ ∈=− jrxl llT
n
r tAfc
 
Where  ∑ ∈= jrxl llT
n
r tAf );(max 1  is the completion time of all tasks and c’ is the factor 
that maps time to payment unit of PMAX and ));((max' 1∑ ∈=−
=
jrxl llT
n
r
MAX
tAfm
P
c
. 
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When conditions satisfy strongly monotonic teamwork, the best way to construct 
teams is to make agents the same level of individual efficiency as a team because mixing 
agents with different levels of individual efficiency does not help improving the team 
efficiency.  
Theorem 3.3: MinCompletion mechanism is a truthful implementation. 
Proof: If group Gj declares a more efficient agent than the real most efficient agent, it does 
not help to decrease the completion time of a task, i.e., uj(A) will not increase. If group Gj 
commits a less efficient agent than its real most efficient agent to a task, it will increase the 
completion time of a task, i.e., uj(A) will be less than the one by telling truth. Therefore, 
MinCompletion is truthful.  
Theorem 3.4: For the synthetic task allocation problem, MinCompletion is a 2-
approximation mechanism and poly-time computable. 
Proof: Under the above assumption, the MinCompletion mechanism automatically 
constructs n teams for k tasks in the following way: every member of the most efficient 
team is the most efficient agent from each group; every member of the second most 
efficient team is the second most efficient agent from each group and so on. The synthetic 
task allocation is equivalent to a task scheduling problem in which k tasks are assigned to n 
agents with different capacities. Let Aopt denote the optimal allocation. Let D1 denote the 
time period within which all n team are executing tasks in parallel and D2 denote the time 
period from the end of D1 to the completion of all tasks by the MinCompletion mechanism. 
∑ ∈== jrxl llT
n
r tAfD );(min 11
 
112 );(max DtAfD jrxl llT
n
r −= ∑ ∈=  
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Therefore, TE(A, Φ) = D1 + D2 
where TE(A, Φ) is the completion time for all tasks. Since all teams are executing tasks 
during D1,   
TE(Aopt, Φ) ≥ D1, 
where TE(Aopt, Φ) is the optimal completion time of all tasks. During D2, there is at least 
one team idle. Since the MinCompletion mechanism allocates each task to the team that 
can finish the task within minimum completion time, in the worst situation, there is one big 
task left after D1. This task should be allocated to the most efficient team. In this worst 
case, the optimal completion time is longer than D2. Therefore, 
TE(Aopt, Φ) ≥ D2 . 
Then, 2TE(Aopt, Φ) ≥ TE(A, Φ).  
The running time of the allocation algorithm of the MinCompletion mechanism is O(nk), 
where k is the total number of synthetic tasks and n is the total number of teams. For each 
task, which team can finish the task within the minimum completion time needs to be 
computed. The allocation algorithm allocates each task to the team that can finish it earliest 
based on the reported types. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, I studied a synthetic task allocation problem by formalizing this 
problem as the algorithmic mechanism design optimization problem (Nisan and Ronen 
1999). Each synthetic task needs to be accomplished through the cooperation among agents 
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who belong to different groups that are self-interested and have different specialties. If the 
capabilities are known, this problem can be solved as a makespan problem. But with self-
interested agents, our goal is to design a payment mechanism that gives agents incentive to 
tell the truth and form optimal teams automatically. The problem is extremely hard in the 
sense that there are O(nm) possible teams (n is the size of a group, and m is the number of 
groups.) and k>>n tasks needs to be executed. Indeed, even the individual task allocation 
problem is NP-hard (Coffman et al. 1987). Therefore, the synthetic task allocation problem 
needs to jointly address incentive compatibility and computational tractability. 
For self-interested agents, I have developed two incentive-compatible mechanisms 
for this problem. The MinTeamwork is an n-approximation mechanism and a strongly 
truthful implementation for monotonic teamwork. By changing the valuation function and 
having a more restrictive assumption, the MinCompletion mechanism is a truthful 
implementation with 2-approximation for strongly monotonic teamwork. I have shown that 
incentive-compatible mechanism design is applicable for synthetic task allocation problems 
in virtual organizations. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DECENTRALIZED COALITION FORMATION THROUGH EXPLICIT 
NEGOTIATION 
 
Distributed task and resource allocation are intertwined problems. Resource users 
need to allocate their tasks to the most efficient resources with the lowest cost. Resource 
providers want to allocate their resources to the most profitable tasks. In many real 
applications such as computational grids and peer-to-peer systems, the participating agents 
are both resource users and providers. The basic idea behind these systems is that agents 
have peak workloads at different times so that they can utilize the resources of others at idle 
time. The task and resource allocation mechanisms can be used to build a virtual 
community, in which participating agents (who might belong to different organizations) can 
share their computational resources to satisfy their excess resource capacity demands 
without purchasing more actual resources individually. In other words, distributed load-
balancing crosses the boundaries of ownership. The aim of this study is to develop a 
decentralized approach to enable coalition formation among self-interested agents through 
automated negotiation.  
As Sandholm (1996) points out, coalition formation processes for self-interested 
agents include three activities: coalition structure generation, solving the problem optimally 
within each coalition and payoff division. The computational cost of this approach has been 
proved extremely expensive. Sandholm et al. (1999) have proved that the complexity of 
coalition structure generation is O(nn) in the worst case. The most important reason for the 
computational complexity is that this approach uses centralized methods (e.g. via a group 
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leader) to search for globally optimal solutions (Yamamoto and Sycara 2001; Li and Sycara 
2002; Ye and Tu 2003). Also, the centralized decision-making approach is not applicable in 
the real world where self-interested agents would like to make their own decisions. Ideally, 
the globally optimal solutions should be achieved through the interaction among agents. 
Toward this goal, I develop a distributed coalition formation mechanism called the 
decentralized coalition formation through explicit negotiation (DCF-EN) mechanism, in 
which self-interested agents reach agreements on whether or not to join a coalition through 
explicit negotiation. The DCF-EN mechanism can dramatically reduce the complexity of 
the coalition formation process by decentralizing two activities in centralized coalition 
formation approaches: coalition structure generation and payoff division.  
 
FORMALIZING COALITION FORMATION 
 
Definition 4.1 (Coalition Formation Problem) 
Let A= {a0, a1,  …, an-1} be a set of agents in a multiagent system. Each agent is willing to 
find partners in A to form a coalition so that it can obtain some benefit (e.g. saving cost) 
that it cannot gain when it acts alone. If no such a coalition exists, agents will act alone. 
Agents can communicate with each other symmetrically.  
Definition of Terms 
• Coalition: A coalition (CL) is a subset of the agent set A that is committed to 
cooperating for a certain purpose (e.g. accomplishing a task). 
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• Coalition Structure: A coalition structure (CS) is defined as a partition of the agent set, 
(i.e., an exhaustive and disjoint set of coalitions, where each agent is in exactly 1 
coalition.)  
• Utility Function: The utility of an agent to join in a coalition is the benefit that the agent 
can obtain from being a member of the coalition. It is defined as a function of the 
corresponding coalition. Without loss of generality, assume that the value of a utility is 
a real number. For example, for agent ai to be a member of a coalition CLj, its utility is 
defined as: Ui(CLj): 2A →ℜ . The goal of agent ai is to maximize its Ui. The utility of 
joining a coalition is computed by each agent itself, and it is based on the agent’s 
preferences and the domain features of the application.  
• Payoff Function: The payoff that agent ai obtains by joining coalition CLj is defined as: 
Pi(CLj) = Ui(CLj) - Ui({ai}). Let P(CL) denote a vector of payoffs of all agents in a 
coalition CL. Let P(CS) denote a payoff configuration that is a vector of P(CL)s of all 
coalitions in a coalition structure CS. 
• Coalition Value: The coalition value of a coalition CL is defined as the sum of the 
utilities that all members obtain through joining the coalition. It can be described with 
the following equation: 
)(CLUV
CLa xCL x∑ ∈=  
• Value of Coalition Structure: The value of a coalition structure CS is defined as the sum 
of the values of all coalitions in the coalition structure. It can be described as the 
following equation: 
∑ ∈= CSCL CLCS y yVV  
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The objective of the coalition formation problem is to find the partition that maximizes VCS 
under the constraint that agents want to maximize their own utilities.  
 
DECENTRALIZED COALITION FORMATION THROUGH EXPLICIT 
NEGOTIATION (DCF-EN) 
 
Given the above coalition formation problem, in this section, I present the DCF-EN 
mechanism, which is a decentralized coalition formation mechanism based on multiparty 
negotiation. There are two main stages in coalition formation. The first is that each agent 
calculates the utilities of all possible coalitions that it could join. The second is that agents 
negotiate to achieve agreements on joining coalitions. The first stage is relatively simple. 
Each agent does exhaustive search for possible coalitions for itself. The second stage is 
much more complex, in the sense that it requires a multiparty negotiation mechanism, 
which involves negotiation strategies, negotiation protocol, and message handling methods. 
Since my goal is to develop a decentralized coalition formation mechanism to be used by 
autonomous agents, communication costs and conflicts need to be taken into consideration. 
 
Constructing Possible Coalition Space 
 
The first stage of coalition formation in the DCF-EN mechanism is constructing a 
possible coalition space for each agent in the agent set A. Each agent computes the utilities 
of all possible coalitions (subsets) in A that also include the agent itself. Then the agent 
removes all possible coalitions for which the utilities are less than the utility obtained by 
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the agent acting alone. It sorts other possible coalitions in a descending order and stores 
these possible coalitions (PCF) as its potential coalition space. In the worst case, for each 
agent, the complexity of computing its PCF is O(2n-2). Figure 4.1 illustrates this process. 
 
 
 
The main purpose of this process is to search for possible coalition proposals for the 
next negotiation stage. The sorting process is used to prioritize all the possible proposals. 
The approach in this work is based on an assumption under which each agent is able to 
compute the utility of joining a coalition according to its local knowledge. Although agents 
do not necessarily know the preferences of others at this stage, it is reasonable to have some 
expectation. In the real world, any agent who wants to join a proper coalition will have a 
prior expectation before it enters negotiations. This expectation could be calculated 
according to prior knowledge or the belief of others’ preferences in a given domain. The 
utility of joining in a possible coalition for an agent represents the expected benefit that this 
 
a1 
FIGURE 4.1. Constructing Possible Coalition Spaces 
a2 a3 
U11({ a1, a2 }) 
U12({ a1, a3 }) 
U13({ a1, a2 , a3 }) 
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U22({ a2, a3 }) 
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U34({ a3 }) 
Descending 
Order 
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agent would obtain from joining in this coalition. I will give examples on how to compute 
the utility of various coalitions in real applications. 
 
Multiparty Negotiation Mechanism 
 
The purpose of developing a multiparty negotiation mechanism in this work is to 
facilitate coalition formation among self-interested agents. Therefore, it is not a single 
bargaining process within one agent group, but multiple bargaining processes within 
multiple agent groups. Assume that all agents have symmetric negotiation abilities in the 
sense that each agent can independently propose a possible coalition and no agent can force 
others to accept a proposal. The communication channels are also assumed to be 
symmetric. There are three main details that need to be defined in such a negotiation 
mechanism (Rosenschein and Zlotkin 1994): the space of possible deals, the negotiation 
strategy, and the negotiation process.  
The Space of Possible Deals 
In the DCF-EN mechanism, the space of possible deals for each agent is its PCF. In 
the worst case, the size is 2n-1-1. For an entire coalition formation process, the space of 
possible deals is the union of all agents’ PCFs. In the worst case, the size is n2n-1 for each 
agent. The reason why the DCF-EN mechanism is still exponential is that the number of 
possible coalitions is exponential in the number of agents n. Agents have to calculate their 
own utilities of joining a possible coalition. As Shehory and Kraus (1998) pointed out that 
the complexity can be reduced to polynomial time by restricting the maximum number of 
agents to participating coalition formation to a constant number, since large groups are 
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unreasonable (e.g. inefficient) in many domains (e.g. buyer coalition formation). If the 
number of agents is restricted to a small constant k, the total number of negotiation deals is 
2k-1. In this situation, the DCF-EN mechanism runs in polynomial time, given k as a 
constant. 
Negotiation Strategy 
Negotiation strategy defines how an agent decides which deals to choose. The goal 
of DCF-EN mechanism is to form coalitions among n self-interested agents. The 
negotiation strategy of each agent should help it join a coalition so that its utility can be 
maximized.  There are two types of negotiation strategies involved in a coalition formation 
process. The first is a bargaining strategy for members in a possible coalition. The second is 
a coalition strategy for finding the best coalition among all possible coalitions. These two 
types of strategies interweave with each other.  
For each possible coalition, all members need to agree on whether or not to join it. 
When an agent proposes a possible coalition to all other members, bargaining can be used 
to determine payoff division. To evaluate all feasible coalitions and to decide which one is 
the best, each agent needs to compare the bargaining results of all possible coalitions and 
find the one that maximizes its utility.  
Since I assume each agent knows the utility that it will obtain by joining a coalition, 
in the current DCF-EN mechanism, the bargaining strategy is that if every member agrees 
on the proposal, the deal is closed; otherwise the agents move on to other possible 
proposals. Because each agent has prioritized its possible coalitions, the DCF-EN 
mechanism lets each agent do greedy searching, namely, always proposing the possible 
coalition with maximal utility first. This way, each agent can end its negotiation procedure 
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whenever it has decided to join a coalition without going through the remaining possible 
coalitions. As a summary, I list the negotiation strategies for an agent in DCF-EN 
mechanism as follows: 
• For each proposed coalition, agents can accept it if it is the best current possible 
coalition, put it into a waiting list if it is better than staying alone or reject it if it is 
worse than staying alone. 
• Agents greedily accept the best coalition they can get. If there are multiple choices, they 
will join a coalition with the smallest size because forming smaller size of coalitions 
through negotiation will result in lower communication cost. 
• Each agent might have multiple negotiation processes going on simultaneously, but all 
of the involved coalitions should result in the same utility for the agent at that time. 
• Each agent terminates a negotiation process when the coalition proposal is formed 
(accepted) or failed (refused). 
Negotiation Process 
A negotiation process defines how negotiation among coalition members is 
conducted. To do so, the following questions need to be answered: What kind of 
information needs to be exchanged among agents? Where does the information flow go 
during a negotiation process?  Because agents communicate with each other in a 
decentralized manner, how could they avoid communication conflicts during negotiation? 
Since multiple negotiation processes might execute in parallel during coalition formation, 
how do they affect each other?  
In the DCF-EN mechanism, agents negotiate with each other by sending messages. 
Three types of messages are needed: offering a proposal, accepting/rejecting a proposal 
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offered by others and closing a deal. Table 4.1 lists all messages exchanged in the DCF-EN 
mechanism.  Negotiation processes for an agent require processing negotiation messages 
from other agents and updating its PCF based on negotiation results in previous negotiation 
processes. A message handling method is called “message handler”. Any negotiation 
decision is made based on the negotiation strategy of buyers. Therefore, the message 
handlers implement the negotiation strategies of agents. 
 
 
Message Type Message Purpose 
CFPropose Proposing a possible coalition to a corresponding member 
CFAccept Accepting a received proposal 
CFReject Rejecting a proposal for a possible coalition 
CFFailed Informing an agent who has sent CFAccept that the corresponding 
proposal has been withdrawn 
CFConfirm Informing an agent who has sent CFAccept that all members have 
accepted the corresponding proposal 
CFNoNeed Informing an agent who proposes a new coalition that the decision 
on joining a coalition at this round has been made 
 
 
The message handlers also embed the negotiation protocol in the DCF-EN 
mechanism. The negotiation protocol is presented as follows: 
• An agent proposes a coalition by sending the proposal to all other members. 
• When an agent receives a proposal, it will send back its decision on whether or not to 
accept it. If it has found a coalition, it will send back its status. 
• After every member agrees to a proposal, the agent who proposed it will send 
confirmation to every member. If the proposal is rejected, the agent who proposed it 
will send failure message to the members who have accepted. 
TABLE 4.1. Messages in the DCF-EN Mechanism 
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• At any given time, each agent can only accept to join in one coalition. 
• Each agent can propose multiple best current coalitions simultaneously. However, all 
these coalitions that have been sent out in parallel should result in the same utility. 
• Each agent terminates a negotiation process on a coalition proposal 1) if the coalition is 
accepted by all members, 2) if the proposal is rejected by anyone of the members, and 
3) if the expected ending time of the corresponding coalition proposal has been 
approached. I will address the reason why this is one of reason to terminate a 
negotiation process in the next section. 
 
Handling Deadlocks in the DCF-EN Mechanism 
 
 
There exist multiple decentralized negotiation processes simultaneously because 
every agent can send out its proposals. Hence the last item of this protocol is designed to 
avoid conflicts and to end negotiations properly. One potential problem is deadlock (Figure 
 
FIGURE 4.2. An Example of Communication Deadlock  
a1 
a2 
a3 
CFPropose 
{a1, a2} 
CFPropose 
{a2, a3} 
CFPropose 
{a3, a1} 
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4.2). A deadlock occurs when an agent proposes to another agent who is waiting for a 
response from a third agent. Figure 4.2 illustrates a simple example. Agent a1 sends a 
current best proposal to agent a2; agent a2 sends a proposal to agent a3 and agent a3 sends a 
proposal to agent a1. Each agent is waiting for feedback. A circle is formed and a deadlock 
happens. 
Indeed, the reason why deadlocks exist is that agents’ individual preferences 
conflict with each other. If deadlocks do not happen during coalition formation, the DCF-
EN mechanism is able to find a coalition structure in which each agent can maximize its 
utility. As a result, the value of the coalition structure is also the maximum. In other words, 
a coalition structure does not exist when a deadlock happens. Resolving a deadlock is 
equivalent to letting each agent know the current proposal in which it is interested might 
not exist. In this case, the agent would move to the next possible coalition proposal. 
Handling these types of deadlocks includes two steps: detecting the deadlock and breaking 
the deadlock.  
There exist many excellent deadlock detecting algorithms in both distributed 
operating systems (Silberschatz et al. 2002) and database concurrency control mechanisms 
(Bernstein et al. 1987). Typical examples are time-out, token-passing and dependent graph. 
Any of them can be extended to detect deadlocks in coalition formation.  
However, breaking deadlocks in coalition formation is different from breaking 
deadlocks caused by multiple processes competing for a common resource in distributed 
operating systems or breaking deadlocks caused by writing to the same variable in a 
distributed database. In these two situations, breaking a deadlock means the common 
resource or the variable will eventually be assigned to one process. Breaking a deadlock in 
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coalition formation means that this coalition structure does not exist. None of the agents 
can be guaranteed to keep its current proposal because in order to break a deadlock, some 
agents need to move to other choices. There are more than two agents in coalition 
formation. The next possible proposal might not involve the same agents as the current 
proposal at all. Therefore, in order to break a deadlock, deciding whether to remain 
committed to the current proposal or to move to the next possible proposal is the key 
decision that each agent needs to make. In the following two subsections, I will address 
what kinds of strategies that the DCF-EN mechanism uses to detect and break deadlocks in 
detail. 
Detecting Deadlocks 
I have considered three approaches to detect deadlocks: time-out, token passing and 
dependent graph. Each has positive and negative consequences for detecting deadlocks in 
coalition formation. Time-out is the simplest method by which each agent detects a 
deadlock if the amount of time it waits for feedback on a proposal exceeds a reasonable 
amount of time. There are several benefits to the time-out approach (Bernstein et al. 1987).  
It is a pure distributed approach in the sense that each agent does not need extra 
information to make a decision. It does not require that any other agents reveal their private 
information, and it does not introduce any extra communication load. The down side of the 
time-out approach is that each agent needs to wait a certain amount of time that is long 
enough to detect the situation.  
Token passing approach (Holliday and El Abbadi, 2005) is also a distributed 
method by which each agent sends out a token with its proposed possible coalition. The 
agents that are involved in the coalition will propagate the token by attaching the token to 
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the proposals that they send out. If the original agent who starts the token receives the token 
later, it will detect that there is a deadlock. The benefit of this approach is that even though 
agents have to wait for a while to detect the deadlock, it is not necessary for each agent to 
wait the same amount of time every time. The down side of this approach is that agents 
need to reveal their private information about who wants to be their partners to their desired 
partners, and it will cause extra communication load. The number of tokens passed to 
agents is equal to the number of messages for proposing all possible coalitions.  
Dependent graph (Bernstein et al. 1987) is a centralized approach by which there 
exists a centralized deadlock detector who knows the proposals that are sent out by all 
agents. Based on the global information, this centralized detector can detect deadlocks by 
constructing a dependent graph and analyzing the dependencies between different 
proposals. In order to let the detector obtain information about all proposals sent out, I 
assume that each agent sends a proposal copy to this centralized detector whenever they 
send out a coalition proposal. The benefit of this approach is that agents do not have to wait 
for a long time to detect whether they are in a deadlock. The obvious down side of this 
approach is that self-interested agents have to reveal their private information to the third 
party and trust the detector absolutely.  Centralized construction of the dependent graph and 
detecting deadlocks are not trivial tasks but NP-hard problems (Bernstein et al. 1987). 
Furthermore, this approach also causes extra communication load. The number of messages 
sent to the centralized detector is equal to the number of proposals sent out. After the 
detector detects deadlocks, it will inform every agent who is involved in the deadlock. 
Functionally, all three of these approaches are able to detect deadlocks. However, 
token-passing and dependent graph approaches require that agents reveal their private 
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information and incur extra communication load. Since agents are self-interested in 
coalition formation, in the current DCF-EN mechanism, we use the time out strategy for 
detecting deadlocks. Furthermore, another reason to choose the time out strategy is that 
each agent needs to decide whether to move to other possible coalition proposals with less 
utility or wait for a while to see if the current proposal can be achieved because others 
might move to new proposals first after a deadlock has been detected. Therefore, agents 
still need to decide how long they would like to wait before they move to other possible 
coalition proposals. I will describe this in detail in the next section.   
Breaking Deadlocks 
During coalition formation, for each agent, breaking a deadlock is equivalent to 
deciding whether to shift to another possible coalition proposal with less utility or to wait a 
while to see if the current proposal can still be made because other agents shift to other 
coalition proposals.  If an agent decides to move to the next possible coalition proposal 
with less utility, it risks that it might lose the opportunity to achieve the current proposal 
with better utility if other agents move to their next proposals first. On the other hand, if the 
agent decides to stick with its current proposal, it risks that the current proposal might 
never be achieved. As a result, it also loses the opportunity to join a coalition with a better 
utility because other agents might form coalitions that do not include the agent at all. 
Hence, estimating how long an agent needs to wait to make a proper decision about 
whether to give up this proposal or not is a critical issue for breaking a deadlock. Agents 
need to consider the risks they will take to make a proper decision. 
In the DCF-EN mechanism, an agent calculates how long it should wait to move to 
the next possible coalition proposal by the following equation: 
 65 
sc
nc
sb
cb
bd UU
UU
UU
UU
ccd
−
−
−
−
−+= )1(
 
where d refers to the amount of time that an agent should wait to move to the next possible 
coalition proposal, cd refers to the amount of time that an agent needs to wait to detect a 
deadlock, cb refers to the maximal amount of time that an agent is willing to wait for 
joining a coalition (except the amount of time it needs to detect deadlocks), Ub refers to the 
utility that the agent can obtain if it joins the best possible coalition in its possible proposal 
list, Uc refers the utility that the agent can obtain if the current coalition is formed, Un refers 
to the utility that the agent can obtain if the next possible coalition is formed and Us refers 
to the utility that the agent can obtain if it does not join any coalition.  
Sandholm and Lesser (1995) extended the Contract Net Protocol to be used among 
bounded rational self-interested agents in a production scheduling domain. In this work, the 
authors pointed out that a more advanced agent should use a risk taking strategy to decide 
whether to accept the current offer now or wait longer to see if there are better offers later. 
Agents need to take the risk of missing opportunities due to others making related contracts 
first. In the DCF-EN mechanism, the current proposal is always better than future 
proposals. Agents need to decide whether or not to wait longer because if other agents give 
up earlier, the current proposal might not be made. The basic idea behind the above waiting 
time equation is that the amount of time that an agent should wait is proportional to the 
difference between Uc and Un (utility of the best and the next best proposal). The larger the 
difference, the longer an agent would like to wait. In other words, if Uc is much larger than 
Un, an agent would be willing to take the risk of waiting longer. If there is no big difference 
between Uc and Un, the agent should move to the next possible coalition proposal in order 
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to avoid missing the opportunity to achieve it. 
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this factor is, the more risk of waiting longer that an agent is willing to take.  The reason 
why I adopt this strategy is that agents do not know other agents' possible coalition 
proposal spaces and they have to make decisions according their local information. If the 
difference between Uc and Un is significant, an agent would be willing to take more risk of 
losing the opportunity to achieve Un because it is possible that it could achieve Uc if it waits 
long enough so that the involved agents make the agreement. 
Another important issue about this equation is how to determine cd (the amount of 
time for deadlock detection) and cb (the difference between the total amount of time that 
each agent is willing to wait in order to find a coalition to join and cd).  In the DCF-EN 
mechanism, setting cd is tricky but manageable (Bernstein et al. 1987). If it is too short, an 
achievable transaction will be aborted. If it is too long, the deadlock will not be detected 
until the timeout period has elapsed. The timeout period is therefore a parameter that needs 
to be tuned. It should be long enough so that most deadlocks are detected, but short enough 
that deadlocks are noticed without waiting too long. The cd should be longer than the 
maximal amount of time by which an agreement can be made without deadlocks 
happening. This maximal amount of time should be equal to or longer than the 
multiplication of 2k (k is the total number of agents and it is restricted as a small constant 
number) and the amount of time of making an agreement without waiting for any other 
proposals.  In the DCF-EN mechanism, each agent itself decides cd. Each agent can set cd 
based on its own preference (e.g. a deadline). In different domains, agents may have 
different preferences.  
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The DCF-EN Agent Structure and Algorithms of Message Handlers 
 
 
 
In my negotiation protocol in the DCF-EN mechanism, all possible coalitions 
construct the space of possible deals (SPCF) for an agent. An SPCF includes three sets of 
possible coalitions for each agent: the proposals an agent has sent out (SCF); the proposals 
it has received (RCF); and all other possible proposals (PCF) that are not in SCF and RCF.  
The relationship among the above coalition sets is given by the following two equations: 
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FIGURE 4.3. Agent Structure in the DCF-EN Mechanism 
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• SPCF = SCF
 
∪ RCF  ∪ PCF; 
• SCF
 
∩ RCF
 
∩ PCF = ∅. 
 
FIGURE 4.4. Message Handler for CFAccept 
If CFSearch is not done 
Then  
   If  All other members in the CF have accepted And not send out any CFAccept 
   Then Send CFConfirm to all other agents in the CF; 
             Send CFNoNeed to all agents who are not members in the CF; 
             If  The size of SCF > 1 
             Then Send CFFailed to all members of the other CFs in SCF 
Else Send CFNoNeed to the message sender 
 
FIGURE 4.5. Message Handler for CFPropose 
If  CFSearch is not done 
Then  
    If  the proposed CF not in RCF, SCF and PCF 
    Then  If  the CF is optimal 
               Then  Send CFAccept 
               Assert the CF to RCF. 
    If  the CF in SCF 
    Then   If  has not sent CFAccept 
               Then Send CFAccept 
    If  the CF in PCF 
    Then  Remove it from PCF; 
               Assert it to RCF; 
               If  the CF is optimal 
               Then Send CFAccept 
Else  Send CFNoNeed to the sender 
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Figure 4.3 shows the agent structure in the DCF-EN mechanism. The pseudo code of all the 
message handlers is presented from Figure 4.4 to Figure 4.9 
 
 
 
 
The diagram in Figure 4.10 illustrates what kind of information needs to be 
exchanged and where a message should go during negotiation. Suppose that the best 
possible coalition for agents a1, a2, a3 and a4 are (a1, a2), (a1, a1), (a3, a2, a4) and (a4, a2, a3) 
respectively. Agent a1 and a3 send CFProposes to agent a2 and a4 first. After agent a2 
 
FIGURE 4.6. Message Handler for CFReject 
If  CFSearch is not done 
Then  Accept new available CF again; 
           Send CFFailed to other members in the CF; 
    If  No more new Candidates 
    Then  Remove the CF from SCF 
 
FIGURE 4.7. Message Handler for CFFailed 
If  CFSearch is not done 
Then  
    If  Has accepted the CF 
    Then Accept new available CF again; 
    If  No more new candidates 
    Then Remove the CF from RCF 
 
 
FIGURE 4.8. Message Handler for CFConfirm 
 
Clean all CFs in SPCF; 
End the current CF search process. 
Send CFNoNeed to any new message sender. 
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receives the CFPropose(a1, a2) from agent a1, it accepts that proposal and sends CFReject 
to agent a3 because agent a3 has sent CFPropose(a3,  a2, a4).  
 
 
 
After agent a3 accepts CFReject, it sends CFFailed to agent a4 because agent a4 sent 
CFAccept before. Agent a1 sends CFConfirm to agent a2 to confirm their coalition. Then 
 
FIGURE 4.9. Message Handler for CFNoNeed 
 
If CFSearch is not done 
Then                        
     For the agent who send the message  
          Remove CFs in PCF, which include the agent; 
          If  Has accepted a CF in RCF, which include the agent  
         Then Accept new available CF again 
         Remove CF in RCF, which include the agent; 
         Send CFPropFailed to all members in CFs in SCF, which include the agent; 
         Remove CF in SCF, which include the agent. 
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FIGURE 4.10. Information Flows in Coalition Formation 
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agent a1 and agent a2 end their coalition formation process. Agent a3 and a4 may continue 
their processes if they can find other partners to form coalitions such that they can obtain 
better utilities than they act alone. The numbers in the circles represent the order of the 
messages being sent out. 
 
Properties of the DCF-EN Mechanism 
 
Compared with the traditional centralized coalition formation approach (Sandholm 
1996, Yamamoto and Sycara 2001; Li and Sycara 2002; Ye and Tu 2003), the DCF-EN 
mechanism has the following advantages: 
Complexity analyses 
• Coalition structure generation is not necessary any more. The DCF-EN mechanism 
significantly reduces the complexity of coalition formation. In the worst case, the total 
number of negotiation deals is 2n-1 for each agent. The number of agents can be 
restricted to a small constant k (Shehory and Kraus 1998) so that the total number of 
negotiation deals is 2k-1. In this situation, the DCF-EN mechanism runs in polynomial 
time, given k as a constant.  
• Since the DCF-EN mechanism relies on communication among agents, the 
communication complexity needs to be examined. Practically, the communication costs 
are not expensive because there are at most three types of messages between two agents 
for each negotiation process: CFPropose, CFAccept/CFReject, CFConfirm/CFFailed. In 
the worst case, the total number of messages for negotiation in coalition formation is 
3n•2n. Again, if the number of agents is restricted to a small number k, the total number 
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of messages is reasonable. In practice, since agents would select the smallest size of 
coalition to join if multiple coalitions result in the same utility, the communication load 
can be further reduced. 
• In traditional centralized approach for coalition formation, payoff division is another 
big challenge in terms of not only stability of formed coalitions but also computational 
complexity (Sandholm 1996). Since each agent makes its own decision on whether or 
not to join a coalition, payoff division is excluded through explicit negotiation 
processes in the DCF-EN mechanism.  
Stability 
The DCF-EN mechanism is a core-stable mechanism in terms of coalition 
rationality. The formal proof is given in the following text. 
The classical core is the strongest of the solution concepts in coalition formation 
(Sandholm 1999). The core of a game is a set of payoff configurations P(CS), where each 
P(CL) is a vector of the payoff of a coalition CL in a coalition structure, CS, to the agents, 
and no subgroup is motivated to depart from the CS. The purpose of this concept is to 
maximize the value of coalition structure, VCS (group rationality) and to motivate agents to 
stay with the coalition structure that maximizes the social welfare (individual rationality). 
Furthermore, every subgroup of agents in a coalition is better off staying within this 
coalition than forming a coalition of their own (coalition rationality). 
The core concept is so strong that the core of a coalition game can be empty in 
many cases. Here, I relax the classical core concept to emphasize only the coalition 
rationality. After a coalition is formed, no subgroup of the coalition is willing to form its 
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own coalition. I define a coalition as stable in the core in terms of coalition rationality as 
the following: 
Definition 4.2: Core-Stable in Terms of Coalition Rationality 
A coalition CL is stable in the core in terms of coalition rationality iff for CLC ⊂∀  and 
Cai ∈∀ , )()( CLPCP ii ≤  is always true. 
Claim 4.1: The coalitions formed through the DCF-EN mechanism are stable in the core in 
terms of coalition rationality.  
Proof: Each agent always tries to join the best coalitions that it can find by using the DCF-
EN mechanism. The best coalition for an agent is the one that maximizes its own utility. 
Before an agent starts any coalition formation process, it will calculate the utilities of all 
possible coalitions to which it could belong. Then it sorts all these coalitions in descending 
order based on the corresponding utilities. The agent greedily proposes or accepts the best 
possible coalition that has not been rejected currently. Any coalition that has been accepted 
by all of its members must be the best coalition for all members that they can find. For each 
agent, if there are multiple coalitions with same utilities, it chooses the one with smallest 
size. Therefore, the value of the best coalition that an agent could join cannot be worse than 
the values of the coalitions composed of any subset of members in this best coalition.    
Lower Bound 
Another important attribute of the DCF-EN mechanism is how good it is in terms of 
the value of resulting coalition structure. 
If the optimal coalition structure is either all agents staying alone or all agents 
staying in the same coalition (grand coalition), the DCF-EN mechanism can find the 
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optimal solution after one proposal has been finished being negotiated. If during an entire 
coalition formation, a deadlock has not occurred, the resulting coalition structure of the 
DCF-EN mechanism is also an optimal solution.   
Definition 4.3: Singleton Coalition Structure 
The coalition structure is called a singleton coalition structure if it only includes agent 
subsets with a size of one. 
For other cases, the DCF-EN mechanism can guarantee a lower bound because an 
agent will not join any coalition that results in a utility for the agent less than the utility that 
the agent can obtain by staying alone. Therefore, the lower bound of the value of resulting 
coalition structure by the DCF-EN mechanism is equal to the value of the singleton 
coalition structure. Is there a better lower bound that the DCF-EN mechanism can provide? 
Since the utility that each agent can obtain by joining a coalition is arbitrary, there is no 
better lower bound that the current DCF-EN mechanism can provide. However, given 
randomly generated utilities for each agent, the results of my experiments will show that 
the DCF-EN mechanism can always result in a non-trivial coalition structure, which is 
better than a coalition structure in which every agent stays alone. Thus, I believe that the 
DCF-EN mechanism can provide a better lower bound if it allows agents to adjust their 
strategies when they recognize that they will end up staying alone.  
In order to guarantee that the resulting coalition structure is better than the singleton 
coalition structure, I extend the current DCF-EN mechanism to a repeated DCF-EN 
mechanism, which is called the RDCF-EN mechanism. The basic idea is to allow the 
original DCF-EN mechanism run multiple times. The first time, each agent runs the full 
original DCF-EN mechanism completely. If it ends up a coalition structure in which every 
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agent stays alone, all agents start the second run in which only coalitions of size two are 
considered. Starting from this turn, agents are no longer greedy. Each agent will accept the 
first coalition that results in better utility than the one it gets by staying alone. If some 
coalitions of size two are formed, the involved agents will stop their coalition formation 
procedure. All agents that cannot find a coalition to join at this turn will start the next turn, 
in which only possible coalitions with size three will be considered. Again, the agents who 
have found a coalition to join stop their coalition formation procedure and the agents who 
still stay alone will keep searching, and so on.  The coalition formation ends when all 
agents find a coalition to join or the nth run has been finished.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.11. Agent algorithm in the Repeated DCF-EN Mechanism 
Calculate PCF 
If the singleton coalition structure is not optimal  
Then 
      Start the DCF-EN negotiation procedure 
      If the resulted coalition structure is not a singleton coalition structure 
      Then  
          Counter = 2 
          While (Counter<=n)  
                Build a PCF with possible coalitions of size Counter 
                Start the DCF-EN negotiation procedure on new PCF  
                If there is a coalition which can be formed 
                Then  
                     Join the coalition 
                     Break 
                Else 
                     Counter++ 
Else 
      End coalition formation 
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Figure 4.11 depicts the formal description of the RDCF-EN mechanism. The 
RDCF-EN mechanism can provide a better lower bound by which the resulting coalition 
structure is always better than the one in which all agents stay alone, if such coalition 
structures exist. 
Claim 4.2:  If the singleton coalition structure is not the optimal solution of coalition 
formation, the RDCF-EN mechanism can always find a coalition structure that is better 
than singleton coalition structure in the sense that the value of the resulting coalition 
structure is larger than the value of the singleton coalition structure. 
Proof: If the singleton coalition structure is the optimal solution of coalition formation, the 
RDCF-EN mechanism can find it right after it finishes calculating the possible coalition 
proposals because there do not exist any possible coalition proposals for every agent. The 
best coalition for each agent is to stay alone. 
If the singleton coalition structure is not the optimal solution of coalition formation, there 
must exist some coalitions that result in better utilities for some agents. The size of those 
coalitions should be larger than one. If during the first turn, the DCF-EN mechanism could 
not find any of such coalitions, from the second turn, agents will accept any coalition that 
results in better utility. Since the RDCF-EN mechanism eventually enumerates all sizes of 
possible coalitions, it will form at least one coalition that results in better utilities for 
involved agents than they stays alone. Therefore, the value of the resulting coalition 
structure is always better than the singleton coalition structure.    
Besides providing better lower bound than the DCF-EN mechanism, the RDCF-EN 
mechanism does not increase the computational complexity significantly. In the worst case, 
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each agent only has 2·2k-1 negotiation deals to be processed. Also, in the worst case, the 
total number of messages for negotiation in coalition formation is 2·3k·2k-1.  
                            
SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, I presented a coalition formation mechanism (DCF-EN) that 
achieves decentralization through explicit negotiation among self-interested agents. Each 
agent makes its own decisions about whether or not to join a possible coalition. Through a 
properly designed multiparty negotiation protocol, the negotiation mechanism allows 
automated multilateral negotiation among self-interested agents who have symmetric 
authority (i.e., no mediator exists and agents are peers) in a multiagent system. 
The resulting coalitions are stable in the core in terms of coalition rationality.  
Compared with the centralized approaches, this mechanism significantly reduces the 
complexity of coalition formation processes. In the next two chapters, I apply the DCF-EN 
mechanism to two different applications for forming coalitions through explicit negotiation. 
The DCF-EN mechanism can provide a trivial lower bound for the value of the resulting 
coalition structure that is the value of the singleton coalition structure. I extend the DCF-
EN mechanism to the RDCF-EN mechanism that can always guarantee to find a better 
coalition structure than the singleton coalition structure, if it exists. 
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CHAPTER V 
FORMING RESOURCE SHARING COALITIONS THROUGH DCF-EN 
MECHANISM 
 
In Chapter IV, I proposed a decentralized coalition formation (DCF-EN) 
mechanism to enable self-interested agents to form coalitions through explicit multiparty 
negotiation. In this chapter, I will show the experimental results of applying the DCF-EN 
mechanism to forming resource sharing coalitions in computational grids.  
In computational grids, the participating agents are organizations that own a large 
amount of computational resources. Even so, these organizations sometimes need extra 
computational capacity to satisfy their computational requirements (i.e. at peak times). 
Meanwhile, most of their resources are idle at other times. The resource sharing 
mechanisms in existing computational grids consist of agreements made through 
negotiation among human representatives belonging to these organizations. Afterwards, if 
there are internal or external changes (e.g. hardware or software upgrades), the resource 
sharing agreements have to be changed by additional negotiations. By applying the DCF-
EN mechanism, autonomous agents can execute these negotiation processes.   
                                                                           
FORMING RESOURCE SHARING COALITIONS IN COMPUTATIONAL GRIDS 
 
Applying the DCF-EN mechanism to computational grids is essential for 
automatically making resource sharing agreements among different organizations. The 
basic idea is to build resource sharing coalitions through multilateral negotiation among 
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self-interested agents. Resources owned by all members in a formed coalition are inter-
connected via a network and can be accessed by every member.  
A key step in the DCF-EN mechanism is that each agent needs to compute the 
utilities of all its possible coalitions. The utility for an agent of joining a resource sharing 
coalition should reflect the benefit obtained from the coalition by the agent. Previously, it 
was assumed that a general currency existed (denoted by grid dollars (Buyya 2002)) for 
expressing the cost of using a computational resource.  However, it is unclear how to 
consistently map the values of different type of resource usages to different amounts of grid 
dollars. Therefore, I propose a task-oriented mechanism for measuring the value of resource 
usage in computational grids. 
 
Economic Value of Computational Resource Usage 
 
Let us start from a simple observation. Suppose there are three processors P1, P2, 
and P3 that have different speeds from the highest to the lowest respectively. Here, I do not 
specify what the exact meaning of the speed of a CPU is. It could be measured by MIPs, 
clock rates, or any other kind of standard units. Given an identical job, these three 
processors would finish it in different amounts of time. Figure 5.1 shows the performance 
of each processor, assuming all other conditions are the same (e.g. same amount of RAM 
associated with each processor). The equivalent performance line depicts the fact that these 
three processors P1, P2, and P3 finish an identical job within H1, H2, and H3 CPU hours 
respectively.  
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If a resource user gives the same job to P1, P2, and P3, how should the processor 
owner charge the user for using different processors? If all processors can satisfy the 
deadline of a job, the resource user would prefer not to pay extra for using P1. But if the 
deadline of the job is tight, he may be willing to pay more for using P1. Therefore, in order 
to set proper prices for using P1, P2, and P3 to execute an identical job, the resource 
suppliers need to consider both the different capabilities of the processors and the users’ 
performance preferences.  
 
 
Modeling Resource Capabilities 
For simplicity, I consider time constraints as the only performance requirement for 
modeling the capabilities of computational resources (e.g. CPU, storage, bandwidth etc.). I 
define the capability of a group of heterogeneous resources as the following: 
Definition 5.1: Let K be a set of tasks, {k1, …, kn}, with a given duration, D (which is the 
total amount of time for accomplishing all tasks in K), and a group of resources, G =  {R1, 
…, Rm}. The capabilities of a group of resources in G for executing the tasks in K is 
 
CPU Hours 
Speed 
C(P1) 
Equivalent 
Performance 
Line 
FIGURE 5.1. Equivalent Performance by Different Processors 
C(P2) 
C(P3) 
H1 H2 H3 
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denoted by CanGroup(G, K, D). CanGroup(G, K, D) is true if and only if the resources in 
G can finish all tasks in K within duration D. 
Pragmatically, to determine if G is capable, there needs to be some scheduling 
algorithms for resources in G that can schedule the tasks in K properly so that the resources 
in G can accomplish them within duration D. The quality of the scheduling algorithm has a 
strong impact on the practical assessment of the capabilities of a group of resources (He 
and Ioerger 2003). The scheduling algorithm used for assessment should be transparent to 
resource users. This definition encapsulates the physical differentiation of resources to 
users. They allow users to ignore the different physical capabilities of resources and only 
consider their own performance preferences.  
Economic Value of Resource Usage  
From a user’s perspective, regardless of the type of resources that are provided to 
execute a task, the economic values of using these resources are equivalent if they can 
accomplish the task while satisfying the same performance requirements. The following 
claim addresses the equivalent values of the usages of two groups of resources: 
Claim 5.1: Let K a set of tasks K = {k1, …, kn} with duration D and groups, G1 and G2, with 
resources, {R11, …, Rm1} and {R11, …, Rr1}, respectively. The economic value of using G1 
to execute the tasks in K is denoted by V1(K). V1(K) = V2(K) if and only if both 
CanGroup(G1, K, D) and CanGroup(G2, K, D) are true. In other words, if CanGroup(G1, 
K, D) is true and CanGroup(G2, K, D) is not true, V1(K) > V2(K); if CanGroup(G1, K, D) is 
not true and CanGroup(G2, K, D) is true, V1(K) < V2(K). 
Note that no agent in a computational grid has the power to set the true economic 
value of using a resource. The value is determined by the interaction among the resource 
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users and suppliers. Whether the established economic value of the usage of a resource is 
stable depends on the relationship between the supply of resources and the demand (Mas-
Colell et al. 1995). The value of resource usage is not the price of using the resource, but a 
fair price should reflect the real value of using the resource.  
Based upon the above analyses, any mechanism for measuring the economic value 
of a computational resource usage should obey the following principles: 
• The economic value of using a resource is determined by the task executed by the 
resource.  
• The values of using two groups of resources relative to a given set of tasks are equal if 
they can accomplish the set of tasks with satisfying the same performance requirements.   
• The real economic value of using a resource is established through the interactions 
among agents in computational grids. 
Task-Oriented Mechanism for Measuring the Economic Value of Resource Usage 
Based upon the above capability model of computational resources, I establish a 
new mechanism for measuring the economic value of resource usage.  Note that the 
economic value of a resource usage is not the intrinsic value of a resource itself, but the 
value of using the resource.  
I use CPUs as an example to illustrate the mechanism. Referring to Figure 5.1, three 
processors with different speeds can be used to execute an identical task. The usage of each 
processor for the task is the same. Mathematically, “the usage of each processor” refers to 
the area of each rectangle in Figure 5.1.  The formal definition of the usage of a processor 
to execute a computational task is given as follows: 
 83 
Definition 5.2: Given a task, k, and a processor, P, the speed of P is C(P). P needs H hours 
to finish k. The usage, S(k), of P for executing k is the following: 
S(k) = C(P) × H 
This definition reflects the amount of processor usage to execute a task no matter what kind 
of processors are used. The following claim is obviously true: 
Claim 5.2: Sx(k) = Sy(k) for given two processors Px and Py with different speeds.   
Based on this claim, a mechanism can be established to translate the usage of CPUs 
with different speeds to a common measurement. The idea is to establish a standard speed 
and convert real CPU usage to the usage of a virtual CPU with the standard speed. Hence 
there are two directions to convert the CPU usage of a task, one is changing the duration 
and the other is changing number of CPUs with the standard speed.  
Users in computational grids generally expect to finish their tasks as soon as 
possible. Given a task with certain duration, I can measure the usage of CPU for executing 
the task by calculating how many standard CPUs should be used to execute the task while 
satisfying the time constraints given by the user. I also define a standard time unit to 
measure the expected duration of a task. Thus, the definition of the usage of processors to 
execute a computational task is modified as follows: 
Definition 5.3: Given a task, k, with a certain expected duration, D, the standard CPU speed 
is C(Ps) and the standard time unit is Ds. D = m × Ds, where m is the number of standard 
time units that D includes. In order to finish k within D, there must be at least n processors 
with speed C(Ps) working simultaneously (assume k can be divided into n subtasks evenly) 
or a processor with speed n × C(Ps). The usage S(k) of CPUs for executing k is the 
following: 
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S(k) = n × C(Ps) × m × Ds 
This definition implies that the CPU usage of any task can be measured through a 
standard speed and a standard time unit. The standard unit of CPU usage is given by the 
following equation: 
Ss = C(Ps) × Ds 
Therefore, the CPU usage for executing a task can be measured through Ss by changing the 
number of CPUs with the standard speed or the number of the standard time units to finish 
a task. Thus, 
S(k) = n × m × Ss 
If the economic value of Ss is Vs, it is easy to calculate the corresponding economic value 
V(k) of CPU usage for executing the task.  
V(k) = n × m × Vs 
However, it does not reflect the common sense that the CPU usage for executing a task in a 
shorter duration might have higher value than the one for executing the same task with a 
longer duration. In order to account for this,  
V(k) = (1+λ1n)× (1+λ2m) × Vs 
where, n and m refer to the increasing number of CPUs with the standard speed and the 
number of the standard time units respectively. The coefficients λ1 and λ2 imply that 
changing the number of CPUs with standard speed and the number of the standard time 
units to finish the same task could result in different economic values of CPU usage. If λ1 ≠ 
λ2, then changing the number of CPUs with standard speed and the number of the standard 
time units to finish the same task causes different economic values of CPU usage.  
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Now, a task-oriented mechanism for measuring the economic value of 
computational resource usage for executing a task has been established. 
 
Forming Resource Sharing Coalitions in Computational Grids 
 
Agents in a computational grid generally have peak workloads at different times, so 
they can potentially utilize others’ resources at their idle time. Thus, I need to define the 
relationship between the workload of each agent and time (Tulga and Sheridan 1980; 
O’Donnell and Eggemeier 1986; Tsang and Wilson 1997). It is called a workload 
distribution function.  
Workload Distribution Function  
Based on the measure of resource usage in the last section, I can define the computational 
capability of an agent (representing the computational resources of an organization on the 
grid) by converting all its CPUs with different speeds to the CPUs with the standard speed. 
The entire CPU capacity of a group of CPUs is defined as follows:  
Definition 5.4: Let U be a group of processors, {P1, …, Pm}, where different Pi in U could 
have different speeds. The standard CPU speed is C(Ps). The speed C(Pi) of Pi is equal to 
ni×C(Ps). The entire CPU capacity C(U) of a group of processors in U within time interval 
[t1, t2] is: 
C(U) =  ∑
=
m
i i
n
1 ×C(Ps)× | t1-t2| 
Hence, the workload of an agent at a certain time point is decided by how many standard 
CPU Pss are needed to run its tasks at that time.  
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Definition 5.5: The workload of an agent at certain time point t is defined as m×C(Ps), if the 
agent needs m standard CPU Pss to run its tasks at time t.  
Definition 5.6: The workload distribution function is defined as a function of time, w(t): T 
→ R, that  is the workload of the agent at time t (T is the set of time points).   
 
 
The workload at a certain moment in a workload distribution function is larger than 
the entire computational capability of an agent because the tasks require more resources 
than it has available. Figure 5.2 shows an example of workload distribution function. In this 
work, it is assumed that the workload distribution function is known (or can be estimated 
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FIGURE 5.2.  Workload Distribution Function 
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FIGURE 5.3.  Idle CPU Distribution Function 
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ahead of time). So negotiation can be done prior to execution of any tasks. (The problem 
could be more difficult if future workloads were unknown, and agents had to adapt and 
adjust cooperation dynamically.) 
To evaluate the cooperation among agents, an idle resource distribution function 
also needs to be defined because resource sharing in grids is mainly related to how much 
idle resource capacity is available for involved agents. 
Definition 5.7: Given a workload distribution function w(t) of an agent within time interval 
[t1, t2] and the entire CPU capacity of the agent is C(U). The idle CPU distribution function 
g(t) is defined as: 
g(t) =  C(U) –w(t),  t ∈ [t1, t2] 
Figure 5.3 shows an example of g(t) when w(t) is given by Figure 5.2. When g(t)>0, 
the agent has idle CPUs. When g(t)<0, the agent is overloaded. Agents are self-interested in 
computational grids. Considering only the idle resource distribution is not enough to form a 
resource-sharing coalition. Each agent needs to consider the economic value of contributing 
its idle resource to others and the cost of using others’ idle resource. 
Definition 5.8: Given the idle CPU distribution function g(t) of agent a within time interval 
[t1, t2], the amount CR of CPU capacity required for agent a is:  
∫=
1
2
t
t
-
R (t)g  g(t))(a,C  
where, g-(t) is equal to g(t) when g(t) < 0 and g-(t) is equal to 0 otherwise. The economic 
value VR of using the idle CPUs of others to finish agent a’s tasks is: 
S
s
R
R VS
g(t))(a,C(g(t))V ×=  
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Definition 5.9: Given the idle CPU distribution function of agent a within a time interval, 
[t1, t2], the amount CI of CPU capacity of agent a is idle:  
∫
+
=
1
2
t
tI
(t)gg(t))(a,C  
where, g+(t) is equal to g(t) when g(t) > 0 and g+(t) is equal to 0 otherwise. The economic 
value VI of agent a’s idle CPUs is: 
S
s
I
I VS
g(t)) (a,C(g(t))V ×=  
Based on the above analyses, the formal problem definition of forming resource-sharing 
coalitions in a computational grid is as follows: 
Definition 5.10: Resource Sharing Coalition Formation Problem 
Let A be a set of agents in a computational grid, {a1, a2,  …, ar}. Each agent ai also has its 
CPU capacity Ni×C(Ps)× | t1-t2| within time interval [t1, t2]. Each agent ai needs to run a set 
of tasks Ki = { ki1, ki2,  …, kil } which generates its idle resource distribution function gi(t) 
within [t1, t2]. The objective is to form appropriate coalitions such that each agent ai can 
have the optimal idle resource capacity exchanging with other agents in A within time 
interval [t1, t2]. 
For each agent in A, the best exchange is to contribute a minimal amount of its own 
idle resource capacity and to obtain a maximal amount of idle resource capacity from a 
resource sharing coalition while finishing as many of its own tasks as possible. To 
determine the optimal idle resource capacity exchange for each agent, the utility function of 
an agent needs to be defined. The utility is composed of two parts. One is the difference 
between the resource capacity the agent obtains from the coalition and the resource capacity 
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it contributes to the coalition. The other is the economic value of finishing tasks by using 
the resource capacity it obtains. 
Definition 5.11: Suppose that agent ai obtains idle CPU capacity Cgain(ai, CLj) by joining a 
resource coalition, CLj, and it contributes its own idle CPU capacity, Cgive(ai, CLj). By 
obtaining Cgain(ai, CLj), agent ai can finish a subset of tasks Ki’ in Ki while satisfying the 
time constraints. The utility, U(ai, CLj), that agent ai obtains by joining coalition CLj is 
given by: 
S
s
ijigivejigain
ji VS
)'S(K )CL ,(aC - )CL ,(aC)CL,U(a ×+=  
 
 
    
Start Message Listener 
    FinishCF = false 
    AcceptCF = false 
    While true 
          If  receive a new message 
          Then process the message by calling corresponding message handler 
          If  FinishCF = false 
          Then  If  startCF=false 
                     Then  Calculate all possible resource-sharing coalitions 
                                Sort all possible coalitions in a descending order in PCF 
                                StartCF = true 
                      Else  If PCF=Ф and SCF=Ф 
                               Then There does not exist possible coalition 
                                         FinishCF = true  
                               Else If RCF=Ф  
                                       Then If SCF=Ф and PCF!=Ф 
                                                 Then Send the current best possible coalition proposal in PCF 
                                                           Assert the send-out CF into SCF  
                                                           Remove it from PCF 
                                        Else If (SCF!=Ф and SCF∈RCF) or (SCF=Ф and PCF.elementAt(0) ∈RCF) 
                                                Then Send CFAccept message to the corresponding agent 
                                                          AcceptCF = true 
 
FIGURE 5.4. Agent Algorithm for Resource Sharing Coalition Formation 
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where S(Ki’) is the amount of CPU capacity that agent ai obtaining from CLj for finishing 
tasks in Ki’. Each agent ai uses this utility function to evaluate its decision on which 
coalitions in the grid it should join by maximizing its utility.  
Agent Algorithm for Forming Resource Sharing Coalitions 
After defining the utility function of each agent, I can now apply the DCF-EN 
mechanism to solve the problem of forming resource sharing coalitions in computational 
grids. Figure 5.4 gives the agent algorithm, in which PCF, SCF and RCF denote the 
possible coalition proposal set, sent-out coalition proposal set and received coalition 
proposal set, respectively. In the following, I present the experimental results that aim to 
show how well the DCF-EN mechanism performs in this application domain. 
 
EXPERIMENTS 
 
The main goal of my experiments is to evaluate how well the DCF-EN mechanism 
performs on the resource sharing coalition formation in computational grids.   
 
Experimental Objective 
 
I mainly focus on the values of resulting coalition structures and the communication 
load caused by negotiation among agents. As for the value of resulting coalition structure, I 
will show that the average lower bound of the DCF-EN mechanism is better than the value 
of the singleton coalition structure (the lower bound was established in Chapter IV). Since 
the DCF-EN mechanism uses a time-out strategy to detect and break deadlocks, Student’s 
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t-test will be used to compare two different time-out strategies: one that waits for a constant 
amount of time, and the other where the amount of wait time is proportional to the 
difference between the utility of the current coalition proposal and that of the next proposal. 
As for the communication load, I will examine that the total number of messages that each 
agent receives during a coalition formation. In other words, I will test the following 
hypotheses: 
• If there exist better coalition structures than a singleton coalition structure, through the 
DCF-EN mechanism, the value of a resulting coalition structure will be higher than the 
value of the singleton coalition structure. 
• The communication load caused by the negotiation among agents is much lower than 
the one in the worst case. (I believe that this hypothesis is valid because agents prefer 
smaller size of coalitions if possible coalitions result in the same utility, and whenever a 
coalition is formed, all members in that coalition will exit the negotiation process.) 
• By using proportional time-out strategies, the DCF-EN mechanism will generate better 
values of resulting coalition structures. Intuitively, I believe that associating wait time 
with utilities of the corresponding coalition proposals is a better strategy, compared to 
waiting for constant amount of time for all possible coalition proposals. Here, a better 
strategy is a strategy that results in higher coalition structure value or causing less 
communication load. 
In real computational resource sharing applications, different workload distributions 
of agents will result in different strategies for resource sharing. If an agent always has a 
heavy workload or mostly has a nearly full workload, it could be hard for this agent find a 
partner to share resources, as it cannot provide much help to others. If an agent always has a 
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low workload at most time and it is only overloaded occasionally, the organization could 
easily find a partner as it can help others a lot. However, the agent might choose not to help 
if it does not see any benefit to itself. For example, a restaurant web server might be only 
busy at lunch or dinnertime and be idle at most other time in a day. If an agent always has a 
regular workload distribution in the sense that it is sometimes overloaded and has idle 
capacity at other times, then the agent may easily find partners because it is able provide 
help to others when it has idle capacity and also needs help from others when it is 
overloaded.   
Since the utilities of possible coalition proposals are determined by the workload 
distributions in resource sharing coalition formation, I need to examine whether different 
workload distributions will result in different coalition structures and different 
communication load. Hence, additional hypotheses need to be tested: 
• Agents with nearly full workload distribution are more likely to choose not to join any 
coalition than agents with the other two types of workload distributions. 
• Different workload distributions will cause different communication load. 
 
Experimental Settings 
 
I consider 10 time units for each experiment. For simplicity, instead of randomly 
generating workload distributions, I directly generate idle resource distribution for resource 
sharing coalition formation. Since I need to test how different workload distributions affect 
coalition formation, I design three types of idle resource distributions: FULL, SPIKE and 
TRIANGULAR.  
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FULL idle resource distribution represents the situation in which an agent has a 
nearly full workload at most time (i.e., has a low utilizable idle resource capacity). SPIKE 
idle resource distribution implies the situation in which an agent is overloaded for short 
durations and has idle capacity at most time. TRIANGULAR implies the situation in which 
an agent is overloaded at some time and has idle capacity at other times.  
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In order to let the values of the resulting coalition structures be comparable, the idle 
capacity is generated randomly using a uniform distribution from 0 to 10 for FULL idle 
resource distribution; from 0 to 1000 for both SPIKE and TRIANGULAR distribution, 
assuming the maximal capacity of each agent is 1000. Figures 5.5 to 5.7 illustrate the 
corresponding workload distributions of these three types of idle resource distributions. 
 
 
I chose 5 agents for each experiment. For each type of idle resource distribution and 
each type of time-out strategy, I ran 20 experiments. Hence, there are a total of 120 
experiments. Table 5.1 lists all values that I collected from each experiment. UCL is defined 
as NOPCL CCU +−=  and Ua is defined as Pa CU −= , where CP is the total amount of 
positive idle capacity that the agent owns and CNO is the total amount of idle capacity that 
the agent obtains from other agents. The basic idea is that idle capacity owned by the agent 
itself decreases its utility and idle capacity obtained from others increases its utility. 
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FIGURE 5.7. TRIANGULAR Workload Distribution 
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Values Description 
CS The resulting coalition structure 
UCL The utility that each agent obtains by joining the coalition it chooses 
Ua The utility that each agent obtains without joining any coalition 
numMsgs[] Numbers of messages that each agent receives for coalition formation 
 
  
Values Description 
VCS The value of the resulting coalition structure, which is equal to the sum of 
the utilities that all agents can obtain in the coalition structure 
Va The value of the singleton coalition, which is equal to the sum of the 
utilities that all agents obtain without joining any coalition 
VCL-a The difference between the value of the resulting coalition structure and 
the singleton coalition 
NS The number of agents who still stay alone after coalition formation 
ANM The average number of messages that an agent receives for coalition 
formation 
 
 
Based on the data that I collected from each experiment, I computed the following 
values in Table 5.2. 
 
Experimental Results 
 
In order to examine my hypotheses, VCL-a, ANM and NS are three main values that I 
am interested in. Table 5.3 lists the experimental results by time-out strategy of 
proportional wait time. PT_Full, PT_Spike and PT_Triangular refer to experiments with 
FULL, SPIKE and TRIANGULAR idle resource distribution respectively.  Table 5.4 lists 
the experimental results when the time-out strategy is to wait for constant amount of time. 
TABLE 5.2. Values Needed to be Computed 
TABLE 5.1. Values Collected from Experiments 
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CT_Full, CT_Spike and CT_Triangular refer to experiments with FULL, SPIKE and 
TRIANGULAR idle resource distribution respectively. 
 
 
PT_Full PT_Spike PT_Triangular  
ANM VCL-a NS ANM VCL-a NS ANM VCL-a NS 
Mean 17.42 28.53 2.9 25.26 3887.05 2.25 29.1 2527.64 1.65 
StdV 5.06 18.88 1.17 6.26 2371.41 0.97 3.18 1469.92 1.31 
 
 
 
CT_Full CT_Spike CT_Triangular  
ANM VCL-a NS ANM VCL-a NS ANM VCL-a NS 
Mean 20.84 31.4 2.9 23.75 3967.35 2 28.05 2439.6 1.55 
StdV 6.21 25.98 0.97 7.51 2000.88 0.97 6.24 1275.27 1.1 
 
 
I ran 120 experiments with 5 agents. Only 7 of them resulted in singleton coalition 
structures. 6 of these 7 experiments are based on FULL idle resource distribution. 
Therefore, the DCF-EN mechanism can generally result in coalition structures that are 
better than singleton coalition structure. Based on the experimental results, the following 
hypothesis is true: 
If there exist better coalition structures than a singleton coalition structure, 
through the DCF-EN mechanism, the value of a resulting coalition structure 
will be higher that the value of the singleton coalition structure. 
The second conclusion that I can draw is that the real communication load is much 
less than the theoretic worst case. For 5 agents, in the worst case, there could be around 240 
TABLE 5.3. Experimental Results for Proportional Wait Time 
TABLE 5.4. Experimental Results for Constant Wait Time 
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messages for each agent. In my 120 experiments, the highest number of messages that an 
individual agent receives is 43.  The mean of the numbers of messages that each agent 
receives during coalition formation is from 18 to 30. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
also true: 
The resulting communication load caused by the negotiation among agents 
is much lower than the one in the worst case. 
In order to compare two different time-out strategies for detecting and breaking 
deadlocks during coalition formation, I did Student’s t-test5 to test the values of resulting 
coalition structures with the same type of idle resource distribution. In my t-test, the values 
generated by PT is group A and values generated by CT is group B. PT refers to the time-
out strategy in which the wait time is proportional to the utility difference between the 
current possible coalition and the next possible coalition. CT refers to the time-out strategy 
by which the wait time is a constant.  
 
                                                 
5
 The t-test results are generated at http://www.physics.csbsju.edu/stats/t-test_bulk_form.html 
 FULL (A-PT, B-CT) 
The results of an unpaired t-test  
 
t = -0.399 
sdev = 22.7 
∆ ≅ -2.9  
degrees of freedom = 38  
The probability of this result, assuming the null hypothesis, is 0.69 
 
FIGURE 5.8. T-Test for FULL Idle Resource Distribution 
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My hypothesis is that the proportional wait time strategy should outperform the 
constant wait time strategy in the sense that the value of resulting coalition structure should 
be higher. Therefore, the hypothesis of the t-test is that the mean of group A is larger than 
the mean of group B.  
 
 
Figures 5.8 to 5.10 show the results of unpaired6 t-tests for FULL, SPIKE and 
TRIANGULAR idle resource distribution respectively. In the t-test results, for both FULL 
and SPIKE idle resource distribution, the t values are all near zero, i.e., the mean for PT is 
not larger than the one for CT. Only the t value for the TRIANGULAR idle resource 
                                                 
6
 I use unpaired t-tests because we want to see the significance of the difference between the means of two 
independent groups of results. 
 SPIKE (A-PT, B-CT) 
The results of an unpaired t-test  
 
t=-0.116 
sdev= 0.219E+04 
∆ ≅ -100.3 
degrees of freedom = 38  
The probability of this result, assuming the null hypothesis, is 0.91 
 
FIGURE 5.9. T-Test for SPIKE Idle Resource Distribution 
 TRIANGULAR (A-PT, B-CT) 
The results of an unpaired t-test  
 
t= 0.202 
sdev= 0.138E+04 
∆ ≅ 88.04 
degrees of freedom = 38  
The probability of this result, assuming the null hypothesis, is 0.84 
 
FIGURE 5.10. T-Test for TRIANGULAR Idle Resource Distribution 
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distribution is positive. The t values for all idle resource distributions implies that the 
probabilities of the corresponding null hypotheses (i.e., there is no big difference between 
the mean for PT and the mean for CT.) being true is high, 0.69, 0.91 and 0.84 for FULL, 
SPIKE and TRIANGULAR respectively. 
 The results of the t-tests do not support the hypothesis by which the performance of 
PT is better than that of CT. To further evaluate the t-test results, I need to test whether the 
DCF-EN mechanism is sensitive to two important parameters, cd (the amount of time that 
an agent needs to wait to detect a deadlock) and cb (the maximal amount of time that an 
agent is willing to wait to join a coalition except the amount of time it needs to detect 
deadlocks). In the above experiments, I let nnd cc 2= , where cn is the amount of time 
required to process a possible coalition proposal without deadlock. In my experiments, cn is 
estimated manually through prior empirical experiments. I also let cb = cd.  
 
 
ST_Triangular PT_Triangular LT_Triangular  
ANM VCL-a NS ANM VCL-a NS ANM VCL-a NS 
Mean 27.22 2316.48 1.9 29.1 2527.64 1.65 28.78 2261.75 2.05 
StdV 4.42 1345 1.3 3.18 1469.92 1.31 2.97 1275.97 1.15 
 
 
In order to test whether the DCF-EN mechanism is sensitive to cb and cd, I 
conducted the following experiments: I ran two groups of experiments with proportional 
wait time strategy and TRIANGULAR idle resource distribution. In one group, I reduced cd 
by half and doubled it in another group. I ran 20 experiments for each group. Let ST denote 
TABLE 5.5. Experimental Results with Different cb and cd 
 100 
the experiments with shorter cb and cd. LT denotes the experiments with longer cb and cd. 
Table 5.5 shows the experimental results. 
 
 
Figure 5.11 shows that the error bars of VCL-a by experiment ST, LT and PT which 
is the experiment with original cb and cd. Figure 5.12 shows that the error bars of ANM by 
experiment ST, LT and PT. Figure 5.13 shows the error bars of the average number (NS) of 
agents who choose not join any coalition after coalition formation. The experimental results 
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do not show a big difference among ST, LT and PT. Therefore, the previous t-test results 
are not very sensitive to parameters cb and cd. 
 
 
Another observation is that the different types of idle resource distribution cause 
different communication load. Figure 5.14 shows the error bar of average number of 
messages for each agent in experiments with different types of idle resource distribution. 
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The error bars of the average number of received messages with the same type of idle 
resource distribution fall into a similar range no matter what kind of time-out strategy used. 
FULL idle resource distribution causes the lowest communication load because agents have 
fewer chances to find partners. TRIANGULAR idle resource distribution results in the 
highest communication load as agents have more opportunities to find partners. 
 
By examining the number of agents who choose not join any coalition after 
coalition formation, I found that FULL idle resource distribution produces the maximum 
agents who choose not join any coalition after coalition formation, and TRIANGULAR idle 
resource distribution results in minimum agents who choose not join any coalition after 
coalition formation. Figure 5.15 shows the error bars of the average number (NS) of agents 
who stay alone after coalition formation with different idle resource distribution.  
Since the different types of idle resource distribution implies different types of 
workload distribution, the following two hypotheses are also valid: 
• Different workload distributions will cause different communication load. 
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• Agents with nearly full workload distribution are more likely to choose not join 
any coalition than agents with the other two types of workload distributions. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, I applied the DCF-EN mechanism to resource sharing coalition 
formation in computational grids. To compute the utility that an agent can obtain by joining 
a coalition, I developed a task-oriented mechanism to measure the economic value of 
computational resource usage. Based on this measurement, agents can compute the utilities 
of sharing others’ idle resource capacity as well as the utilities of contributing their own 
idle resource capacity to other agents in a grid. 
To examine how well the DCF-EN mechanism performs on resource sharing 
coalition formation, I designed experiments with three types of idle resource distribution, 
FULL, SPIKE and TRIANGULAR. The experimental results support the following 
hypotheses: 
• If there exists better coalition structures than a singleton coalition structure, through the 
DCF-EN mechanism, the value of the resulting coalition structure will be higher than 
the value of the singleton coalition structure. 
• The communication load caused by the negotiation among agents is much lower than 
the one in the theoretic worst case. Different workload distributions will cause different 
communication load. 
• Agents with nearly full workload distributions will have more chances to choose to not 
join any coalition than agents with other two types of workload distributions. 
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Before I ran the experiments, I expected that by using different time-out strategies, 
the DCF-EN mechanism would generate different values of resulting coalition structures. 
However, the t-test results showed that there was not much difference between the time-out 
strategy with proportional wait time and the time-out strategy with constant wait time. 
Overall, the experimental results show that the DCF-EN mechanism can generally generate 
better coalition structures than the singleton coalition structure (i.e., working alone). The 
communication load of the DCF-EN mechanism is also practical. 
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CHAPTER VI 
COMBINING BUNDLE SEARCH WITH BUYER COALITION FORMATION 
 
The DCF-EN mechanism is not only applicable for establishing virtual communities 
for computational resource sharing, but it is also practical for other applications such as 
buyer coalition formation in electronic markets. Small buyers without bargaining power 
(Proter 1980) individually can form a coalition as a virtual big buyer (He and Ioerger 
2004b, 2005a). As a result, sellers could be willing to give a greater discount to the whole 
group.  
Combinatorial trade in electronic markets is becoming more and more important. In 
electronic markets, buyers are able to access an incredible amount of product information 
through the Internet. This advantage allows buyers to build better purchasing strategies to 
save costs. Forming buyer coalitions among small buyers is one such purchasing strategy 
that allows small buyers with little individual bargaining power to form a virtual big buyer 
that can obtain better discounts.  
Another very interesting buyer strategy is called the “bundle search” that addresses 
the situation where a buyer needs to buy different goods as a bundle. A typical example is 
the travel package search problem (Chang et al. 2003). Because of the different retail prices 
and discount policies of different suppliers, different bundles result in different discounts. 
The problem is to find the optimal bundle that results in minimum cost. Actually, searching 
for the maximal discount of a buyer coalition can be viewed as a bundle search problem if 
the discount policies of sellers are based on the total cost to all buyers in the buyer 
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coalition. Under this kind of discount policy, it is valuable for buyers to use both bundle 
search and buyer coalition formation to obtain better discounts. 
In this Chapter, I consider both combinatorial coalition formation and bundle search 
together when the discount policies of sellers depend on the total cost of all goods sold in 
each transaction. I apply the DCF-EN mechanism to solve the following purchasing 
problem: 
Definition 6.1: A Purchasing Problem 
Let G = {g0, g1,  …, gl-1} denote a collection of goods. Let B be a group of buyers, {b0, b1,  
…, bm-1}, where each of them has a shopping list denoted by vector Qi = (qi0, qi1,  …, qi,l-1), 
where qik refers to the quantity of each item, gk, buyer bi needs to buy (i = 0, 1, .., m-1; k = 
0, 1, .., l-1). There is a set of sellers, S = {s0, s1,  …, sn-1}, who can supply some or all of the 
goods in G. Each seller, sj (j = 0, 1, .., n-1), has its own discount function δj(c): +ℜ → +ℜ , 
that is the discount a buyer obtains when the cost of his purchase from seller, sj, is c. Pj = 
(pj0, pj1, … pj, n-1) is a retail price (per unit) vector for each seller, sj. The cost of buyer, bi is 
denoted by ci: ∑ ∑∑ ×δ−×=
−
=
−
=j ikjk
l
kjikjk
l
ki
qpqpc ))(( 1
0
1
0 . If seller, sj, has no good, gk, 
available, Pjk = 0. The objective of the problem is to minimize the cost to each buyer in the 
buyer set, B, i.e. min∑
−
=
1
0
m
i i
c
. 
Definition 6.2: Discount Ratio 
The discount ratio is defined as the ratio of the discount to the corresponding cost: 
ccrd /)(δ= , where δ(c) is the amount of discount that a buyer can obtain by spending c 
dollars in one transaction. The discount ratio must have an upper bound in a real market, 
because sellers need to guarantee that their profit is positive. Hence, searching the 
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maximum discount could be interpreted as finding the highest discount ratio the buyers can 
obtain. 
The discount ratio function may not be monotonic increasing along with the amount 
of cost. In other words, more cost will not necessarily result in a higher discount ratio. For 
example, J.C. Penney provides $10 off for purchases over $50, $15 off for purchases over 
$75 and $35 off for purchases over $150 on certain sale days. Figure 6.1 shows the 
corresponding discount ratio function. 
 
Definition 6.3: Buyer Utility 
The utility of a buyer is defined as the difference between the discount he can obtain by 
shopping alone and the one he can get by using a purchase strategy based on buyer coalition 
formation: bCL ddu −= , where db is the discount that a buyer can obtain by shopping alone 
and dCL is the discount that the buyer can obtain by shopping with partners. Each buyer tries 
to maximize its own utility. 
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Note that dCL for each buyer depends on how the corresponding shopping group 
divides the total discount that it obtains. Assume that the discount of each buyer is 
proportional to the cost it contributes to the group, i.e., for buyer bi, c
c
cd ijiCL ×δ= )(  where 
c is the total cost of the group, ci is the cost of buyer bi and δj(c) is the total amount of 
discount the group obtains from seller sj, 
 
TRADITIONAL CENTRALIZED APPROACH 
 
Traditionally, the above purchase problem can be solved by a centralized approach. 
Suppose there is a buyer leader who has all information about buyers and sellers. The buyer 
leader searches for the optimal strategies for buyers (Li and Sycara 2002). The simplest 
centralized approach is to enumerate all possible coalition structures of all goods that 
buyers need to purchase and find the optimal coalition structure that minimizes the costs of 
all buyers.  
However, the computational cost of this approach is prohibitively expensive. The 
total number of all possible coalitions is 2NQ – 1. Sandholm et al (1999) have already 
proved that the total number of all possible coalition structures is O(NQNQ), which is so 
huge that not all coalition structures can be enumerated unless the number of all goods is 
extremely small (below 15 or so in practice). Also, for each coalition, an optimal bundle 
search needs to be done. The time complexity of the optimal bundle search is O(NM) in the 
worst case, where M is the number of goods, and N is the number of sellers (Chang et al. 
2003).  
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Another costly computation of this centralized approach is evaluating whether the 
resulting coalitions are stable in the core (Kahan and Rapoport 1984; Li and Sycara 2002). 
The reason to do this is because buyers will refuse to join a coalition that causes higher cost 
than the cost of joining other coalitions. A buyer leader needs to calculate the total cost to 
each buyer in every coalition structure and determine whether the coalitions are stable (Li 
and Sycara 2002).  
In real electronic markets, buyers are self-interested and geographically distributed. 
They make purchase decisions based on their local information and on minimizing their 
own cost. The incentive of buyers to join a buyer coalition is to obtain a greater discount 
than they would from purchasing individually. It is more realistic to let buyers make their 
own decisions (Shehory and Kraus 1999; Lerman and Shehory 2000) and form coalitions 
through negotiation than it is to set a coalition formation leader to evaluate the coalition 
value and distribute the payoff. I propose a distributed approach based on the DCF-EN 
mechanism for solving the purchasing problem. It is much more efficient and practical than 
the centralized approach for real applications. 
 
A DISTRIBUTED APPROACH 
 
My approach to solving this purchasing problem involves two steps. First, buyers 
do their individual bundle searches to find the optimal bundle for their own shopping lists. 
If the discount ratios obtained from the sellers involved in the optimal bundle are the 
maximal discount ratios that the sellers can offer, buyers do not have incentive to form or 
join any buyer coalition, since they cannot increase the amount of discount they can gain. 
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Otherwise, buyers start the second step by either searching for coalitions proposed by other 
buyers or proposing new coalitions to related buyers.  
The reason for a buyer to do a bundle search first is that the discount resulting from 
the individual bundle search belongs to the buyer for sure. The possible discount obtained 
from joining a buyer coalition is uncertain because it depends on whether buyers can 
achieve a consensus. It is possible to miss the optimal result by separating the bundle 
search and the coalition formation into two steps, but it ensures that buyers obtain the 
discount at least as much as they can get individually. 
The objective for buyers to join a coalition is to obtain a greater discount from one 
seller. I set an independent buyer club agent for each seller in S. If buyers are interested in 
joining the coalitions related to a specific seller, they register in its buyer club and obtain 
information about other buyers who need to join coalitions from the buyer club.  Buyer club 
agents have nothing to do with the negotiation process among buyer agents except for 
providing the initial information about possible partners. 
 
BUNDLE SEARCH PROBLEM 
 
Compared with buyer coalition formation, the bundle search problem targets a 
single buyer who has a shopping list that includes a set of desired items.  
Definition 6.4: Bundle Search Problem 
let Qi be a shopping vector (qi0, qi1,  …, qi,l-1), where qij is equal to 1 or 0. Let S be a set of 
sellers {s0, s1,…, sn-1}, who can supply some or all of the goods in Qi. Each seller sj (j = 0, 
1, .., n-1) has its own discount function δj(c): R+ → R+. The problem is to find an optimal 
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purchasing strategy (i.e., partitioning goods in Qi by the targeting sellers in S) in the sense 
that it takes buyer bi the minimal cost to purchase all goods with qij = 1 in Qi.   
The optimal algorithm for the bundle search problem is trivial. The idea is to 
enumerate all partitions of goods on the buyer’s shopping list based on different 
combinations of sellers. The partition that results in minimal cost is the optimal bundle. 
The time complexity of this algorithm in the worst case is O(NM) (Chang et al. 2003). If the 
prices of items on the shopping list are not affected by adding more items, dynamic 
programming can be used to solve this problem with time complexity O(N2). However, this 
is not the case for the purchasing problem here. The price of each item is changed by the 
discount ratio that the buyer obtained. The discount ratio is a function of the total cost to a 
buyer. If a dynamic programming algorithm is used, when a new item is added, the total 
cost may change and the discount ratio may also change. In this case, the price of items that 
have already been calculated may change. Hence, the dynamic programming algorithm is 
not appropriate for this problem.  
I have developed an efficient heuristic algorithm to solve this bundle search 
problem. It is called Maximal Gain Bundle Search (MGBS) algorithm. The algorithm is 
based on the following three heuristic rules: 
Rule #1 Maximal Bundle: The problem of bundle search comes from the general economic 
situation where the more one spends with a single seller, the more discount one gets from 
that seller. I call the bundle purchase from one seller that provides the maximal discount the 
“Maximal Bundle”. If the cost of a bundle with the maximal discount from every available 
seller is larger than the sum of the corresponding minimal retail prices for the goods in the 
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bundle, then it is not necessary to continue the bundle search. The buyer just needs to buy 
all goods in the bundle at the lowest retail prices. 
Rule #2 Maximal Gain Ratio: If the costs of maximal bundles from multiple sellers are less 
than the sums of the corresponding minimal prices, the seller with the best ”Maximal Gain 
Ratio” is picked as the candidate seller.  
To define this term, I need to define the gain of each bundle purchase from one 
seller. In this paper, the gain of each bundle purchase is not defined by the amount of the 
discount. If the prices provided by a seller are too high, even if it gives a large discount, the 
purchase cost could still be very high.  So, the gain of each bundle purchase is defined to be 
the difference between the final cost of this bundle purchase and the sum of the 
corresponding minimal prices. The gain ratio is defined to be the ratio of the gain of a 
bundle purchase to the sum of the corresponding minimal prices; so the maximal gain ratio 
is the ratio of the gain of the maximal bundle purchase to the sum of the corresponding 
minimal prices. 
Suppose that there is a set of sellers, Sb = (Sb0, Sb1, …, Sbk) for a bundle of goods, 
Gb = (Gb0, Gb1, …, Gbk). The gain ratio g(Gb, Sb) of the bundle of Sb is defined by the 
following equation: 
∑
∑∑∑ −−
= G b
G b
S b
G b
S b
G b
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m i n
m i n )(),(
 
∑ GbSbP denotes the sum of the prices of all goods in Gb of the sellers in Sb. ∑
GbPmin denotes the 
sum of the minimal prices to purchase all goods in Gb. denotes the sum of the discounts 
obtained from all of the sellers in Sb for purchasing goods in Gb as a bundle. Maximal gain 
ratio is defined as a ratio of the difference between the sum of minimal retail prices of the 
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bundle and the cost of the bundle after applying a discount to the sum of minimal retail 
prices of the bundle. 
 
 Begin MGBS (G, S, Mp, Mr)  
|PV| = |G|, | minP | = |G |, | minSV | = |G | 
( minP is the minimal price vector and minSV  is the corresponding seller Vector)  
MaxCost = ∑ iPmin - ∑δi( iPmin ) 
For each seller Sj 
     MaximalBundle[j] = ∑Mpj 
     MaxDiscount[j] = δj (MaximalBundle[j]) 
     BundleCost[j] = MaximalBundle[j] - MaxDiscount[j] 
For all BundleCost[j] 
      If All of BundleCost[j]s > MaxCost[j]  
      Then  PV = minSV , PC = MaxCost 
                 Return PV, PC 
      Else  
           For each BundleCost[j] 
               MinBundleCost[j] = δj -1(MaxDisicount[j]) 
               MinBundle[j] = FindMinBundle (MinBundleCost[j], j, Mp) 
               g(MinBundle[j], Sj) = (MaxSubCost[j]-BundleCost[j])/MaxSubCost[j] 
Pick MinBundle[k] of seller Sk  with argmax g(MinBundle[k], Sk)  
For each item m in MinBundle[k] 
     PVm = Sk 
PC = PC + MinBundle[k] - discountFunction(MinBundle[k], Sk) 
Set the entries of the corresponding rows of this MinBundle[k] to 0 in Mp and Mr 
       If All entries in Mr are 0  
    Return PV, PC 
Else MGBS( Mp, Mr) 
End MGBS (Mp, Mr). 
 
Begin Procedure FindMinBundle (MinBundleCost, j, Mp)  
Fetch the column j in Mp to be the good vector GVj of seller Sj 
Sort GVj according to the price increasingly 
s = |GVj| 
While (s>0)  
     Remove the last element L in GVj 
     If the sum of prices in GVj < MinBundleCost 
     then GVj ← GVj + L 
     s ← s – 1  
Return GVj       
End FindMinBundle (MinBundleCost, j, Mp)                                          
FIGURE 6.2. Maximal Gain Bundle Search Algorithm 
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Rule #3 Bundle Regression: Since the discount ratio may not be monotonic increasing, 
through the inverse function of the discount function, the minimal cost to get the same 
amount of discount of a maximal bundle can be found. Based on this minimal cost, I can 
search for the cheapest bundle purchase with the same amount of discount from this seller, 
and leave the other goods for another round of searching. Before calculating the maximal 
gain ratio, the maximal bundle for each seller should be refined to the “minimal bundle” 
from the seller with the same amount of discount as the maximal bundle. This rule provides 
a method to refine the search results already obtained from the two rules above. The 
heuristic goal here is to achieve a higher discount ratio for each partial bundle purchase. 
 
 
DonePurchase = false 
Run the MGBS algorithm to get the optimal bundle with a seller vector SV 
For each si in SV  
    If  The cost in the optimal bundle does not cause the seller to offer its highest discount ratio 
   Then Send CFRequire to the corresponding buyer club agent 
If  All sellers in SV do not need to send CFRequire 
Then DonePurchase = true 
Else While true 
            If  receive a new message 
            Then process the message by calling corresponding message handler (defined in Chapter IV) 
            If  DonePurchase = false 
            Then  If  startCF=false 
                     Then  Calculate all possible resource-sharing coalitions 
                                Sort all possible coalitions in a descending order in PCF 
                                StartCF = true 
                      Else  If PCF=Ф and SCF=Ф 
                               Then There does not exist possible coalition 
                                         DonePurchase = true  
                              
 Else If RCF=Ф  
                                       Then If SCF=Ф and PCF!=Ф 
                                                 Then Send the current best possible coalition proposal in PCF 
                                                           Assert the send-out CF into SCF  
                                                           Remove it from PCF 
                                        Else If (SCF!=Ф and SCF∈ RCF) or (SCF=Ф and PCF.elementAt(0)∈ RCF) 
                                                Then Send CFAccept message to the corresponding agent 
                                                          AcceptCF = true 
    
FIGURE 6.3. Buyer Agent Algorithm 
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The outputs of the bundle search for buyer bi is a seller vector SVi = (svi0, svi1,  …, 
svi,l-1), where svij = null if qij = 0, otherwise svij is equal to the corresponding seller’s ID. 
With the seller vector, buyer bi can calculate whether he has obtained the highest discount 
ratios from sellers in SVi. Figure 6.2 gives the algorithm (He and Ioerger 2003). 
 
COMBINING BUNDLE SEARCH AND BUYER COALITION FORMATION 
 
Buyers start their coalition search based on the results of their bundle search in the 
first step. Each buyer only registers with the buyer clubs involved in the individual optimal 
bundle result. When buyers’ bundle searches do not include a particular seller, or when they 
have already obtained the optimal discount ratio from a seller, they do not register with the 
corresponding buyer clubs. I apply the DCF-EN mechanism to the buyer coalition 
formation processes. The complete buyer agent algorithm is in Figure 6.3. 
 
SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
To evaluate the results of my solution to the purchase problem and the efficiency of 
the distributed coalition formation mechanism, I need to evaluate the costs of buyers using 
different purchasing strategies. The main goal of my simulation is to evaluate the average 
cost to each buyer and the total cost to all buyers with different purchasing strategies.  
I will compare the cost to each buyer and the total cost to all buyers using the 
following four purchasing strategies:  
• Purchasing each of the goods with the lowest price in the market; 
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• Combining the optimal bundle search and buyer coalition formation through the DCF-
EN mechanism; 
• Combing the MGBS bundle search and buyer coalition formation through the DCF-EN 
mechanism; 
• The optimal solution of the purchasing problem (Since the computational cost is too 
high to run an optimal algorithm for the purchasing problem, to compare the results 
with the optimal results for a certain purchase problem, I use the lower bound of the 
optimal cost for a buyer, which is the sum of the minimal retail prices of all his goods 
with obtaining the highest discount ratio in the market. In real markets, it is impossible 
for buyers to obtain this lower bound cost). 
 
 
Parameters Experimental Values 
N×M  3×3, 4×4, 5×5 
Numbers of Buyers  3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
 
Discount Function 
                10, if 50 ≤ c < 100; 
δ1 (c) =     20, if 100 ≤ c < 150; 
                35, if 150 ≤ c < 200; 
                c×20%, if c ≥ 200. 
 
 
Based on the purchasing problem definition, the input parameters and the discount 
function used in my simulation are given in Table 6.1, where G refers to the vector of 
goods and S refers to the vector of the corresponding sellers, N = | G | and M = | S |. Indeed, 
the discount function defined in Table 6.1 is used by JCPenny, Dillards and Foleys etc. 
department store very often. Since, in a real market, the buyers with a small amount of 
TABLE 6.1. Parameters Used for Simulation 
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purchase cost are more likely join a buyer coalition, I did not use large numbers of items 
and sellers in my simulation. 
 
 
 
In real markets, sellers adjust retail prices very often. For example, Walmart and 
HEB change food prices every week. However, JCPenny does not adjust its discount policy 
very often. Thus, I assume that sellers have the same discount policies, but the retail prices 
offered by different sellers are different (I will test different discount policies later). I 
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generated the seed price of each goods from each seller randomly using a uniform 
distribution from 0 to 50. For the same goods, based on the corresponding seed price, I 
generated the price for each seller by adding a random number, which is generated using a 
uniform distribution form 0 to 10. Therefore, for same goods, the price difference between 
two sellers is less than 10.  
 
 
Given different combinations of N×M, I ran the experiments for different number 
(3-9) of buyers. For each different number of buyers, I ran 20 experiments.  
Figure 6.4 shows the mean of the total cost to all buyers using different purchasing 
strategies when N×M is 4×4 and the total number of buyers is 5. Figure 6.5 shows the error 
bars of the average cost of each buyer. RetailMinPrice denotes the cost to a buyer using the 
 A-LBOptimal, B-RetailMinPrice 
The results of an unpaired t-test  
 
t = -3.66  
sdev = 24.0  
∆ ≅ 27.78 
degrees of freedom = 38  
The probability of this result, assuming the null hypothesis, is 0.0008 
FIGURE 6.6. T-Test for Comparing RetailMinPrice and LBOptimal 
 A-LBOptimal, B-OptimalBundleCF 
The results of an unpaired t-test  
 
t = -1.18  
sdev= 21.9  
∆ ≅ -8.15 
degrees of freedom = 38  
The probability of this result, assuming the null hypothesis, is 0.25 
FIGURE 6.7. T-Test for Comparing OptimalBundleCF and LBOptimal 
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strategy of only searching for the minimal retail price in the market for each item needed. 
OptimalBundleCF denotes the cost to a buyer of doing an optimal bundle search first and 
then trying to join buyer coalitions. MGBSBundleCF denotes the cost to a buyer of doing 
an MGBS bundle search first and then trying to join buyer coalitions. LBOptimal is the 
lower bound of the optimal cost that a buyer has to pay, which is equal to the sum of the 
minimal retail prices of all the buyer’s goods with obtaining the highest discount ratio.  
 
Based on the above experimental results, both OptimalBundleCF and 
MGBSBundleCF are very close to the lower bound of the optimal value and much better 
than using the strategy of only searching for the minimal retail price in the market. For each 
buyer, the difference between using MGBSBundleCF and LBOptimal is 8.54, and the 
difference between using OptimalBundleCF and LBOptimal is 8.15. However, the 
difference between using RetailMinPrice and LBOptimal is 27.78. Figures 6.6 to 6.8 show 
the Student t-test results7 of comparing RetailMinPrice and LBOptimal, OptimalBundleCF 
and LBOptimal, MGBSBundleCF and LBOptimal respectively. The t-tests results also 
support the above conclusion. 
                                                 
7
 The null hypothesis is that the mean of group A is not less than the mean of group B. 
 A-LBOptimal, B-MGBSBundleCF 
The results of an unpaired t-test  
 
t = -1.22  
sdev = 22.0   
∆ ≅ -8.45 
degrees of freedom = 38  
The probability of this result, assuming the null hypothesis, is 0.23 
FIGURE 6.8. T-Test for Comparing MGBSBundleCF and LBOptimal 
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Figure 6.9 shows the total cost to all buyers for using different purchasing strategies 
with different number of buyers when N×M is 4×4. For different numbers of buyers, both 
OptimalBundleCF and MGBSBundleCF are also close to the lower bound of the optimal 
value and much better than using the strategy of only searching for the minimal retail price. 
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Figure 6.10 shows the average cost to each buyer. The difference between the 
average cost to each buyer does not increase or decrease significantly as the number of 
buyers increases in the market. OptimalBundle denotes the cost to a buyer of doing an 
optimal bundle search without joining any buyer club. MGBSBundle denotes the cost to a 
buyer of doing a MGBS bundle search without joining any buyer club. It also shows that 
combining bundle search strategy and buyer coalition formation strategy can reduce the 
cost more than just doing a bundle search and that the cost is very close to the optimal cost. 
Indeed, buyer coalition formation can be viewed as an extension of the bundle search 
strategy by extending the shopping list of one buyer to multiple buyers. In order to 
guarantee to obtain the discount that each buyer can obtain by himself, my current 
algorithm makes each buyer do bundle search first. Then, based on the result of bundle 
search, each buyer decides whether to participant in buyer coalition formation or not. 
Therefore, the results show that combining bundle search strategy and buyer coalition 
formation strategy can reduce the cost more than just doing a bundle search in every single 
experiment. 
In order to test how my algorithm perform under different discount policies, I 
considered the following two discount policies: δ2(c) = 10 if c ≥ 50 and δ3(c) = 35 if c ≥ 
150. It is very easy to find real examples for these two discount policy. At many online 
stores (e.g. Amazon.com), if you spend $50, they normally give you free shipping that may 
cost you $10 in one transaction. In many fashion stores, it is very normal to obtain a $35 
gift card if you spend over $150 in one transaction. Another reason to consider these two 
discount policies is that they are comparable to the previous discount policy δ1(c) (defined 
in Table 6.1). I want to test the following hypotheses: 
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• Since discount policy δ1(c) allows buyers have more choices to obtain discounts, each 
buyer will obtain more discount under discount policy δ1(c) than under the other two 
discount policies. 
• For all three discount policies, combining buyer coalition formation and bundle search 
can reduce the cost more than just doing a bundle search. 
• For discount policy δ2(c), there are few chances for buyers to form coalitions because as 
long as the total cost is larger than $50, no matter how much more a buyer spends, the 
total amount of discount is $10. For discount policy δ3(c), there are more chances (than 
δ2(c)) for buyers to form coalitions because the input price for each goods is less than 
$50. In order to obtain a discount, a buyer needs to spend $150.  
• For discount policy δ2(c), the communication load is lower than the one under another 
two discount policies because few negotiation processes were required.  
 
 
 OptimalBundle MGBSBundle MGBSBundleCF OptimalBundleCF 
δ1(c) 518.367 520.85 507.97 506.02 
δ2(c) 530.47 533.30 528.30 505.81 
δ3(c) 590.99 590.99 554.97 530.98 
 
 
Given N×M is 4×4 and the total number of buyers is 5, for each combination of 
discount policy (including δ1(c), δ2(c) and δ3(c)) and purchasing strategy (including 
MGBSBundle, OptimalBundle, MGBSBundleCF and OptimalBundleCF), I ran 20 
experiments. Table 6.2 lists the total cost for all 5 buyers using different type of purchasing 
TABLE 6.2. Total Cost to All Buyers 
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strategies under different discount policies. The results show that δ1(c) has the best 
performance in the sense that it costs the buyer the least. 
 
 
Figure 6.11 depicts the average cost to each buyer for using different purchasing 
strategies under different discount policies. Figure 6.11 also shows the costs to buyers using 
RetailMinPrice and LBOptimal. All purchasing strategies, MGBSBundle, OptimalBundle, 
MGBSBundleCF and OptimalBundleCF can reduce costs more than RetailMinPrice. 
MGBSBundleCF and OptimalBundleCF can reduce costs more than MGBSBundle and 
OptimalBundle. Thus, the experimental results support hypothesis 1 and 2. However, the 
improvement in savings for MGBSBundleCF is less pronounced under δ3(c), compared to 
δ1(c) and δ2(c). 
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 MGBSBundleCF OptimalBundleCF 
δ1(c) 2 1 
δ2(c) 15 12 
δ3(c) 4 2 
 
 
Table 6.3 lists the numbers of experiments in which no buyer coalitions were 
formed under different discount policies and different purchasing strategies (For each 
combination of a discount policy and a purchasing strategy, I ran 20 experiments). The 
results show that buyers did not form coalitions very often under discount policy δ2(c). 
Under discount policy δ1(c) and δ3(c), buyers formed coalitions very frequently. Therefore, 
hypothesis 3 is valid. 
TABLE 6.3. Numbers of Experiments without Buyer Coalitions Formed 
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 As for communication load, Figure 6.12 shows the average number of messages 
that each buyer received in each experiment and the error bars. Under discount policy δ2(c), 
each buyer received the least number of messages. Hence, hypothesis 4 is valid.  
 
SUMMARY 
 
In electronic markets, both bundle search and buyer coalition formation are 
profitable purchasing strategies for buyers who need to buy small amount of goods and 
have no individual bargaining power. It is very valuable to combine these two purchasing 
strategies for buyers to obtain greater discounts based on the different discount policies of 
multiple sellers. In this chapter, I presented a distributed mechanism that allows buyers to 
use both purchasing strategies. The mechanism includes a very efficient heuristic bundle 
search algorithm and a distributed coalition formation scheme that is based on the DCF-EN 
mechanism. The simulation results show that the cost to buyers is close to the optimal cost.  
I also tested how the DCF-EN mechanism performs under different discount policies. The 
simulation results show that combining bundle search and buyer coalition formation can 
always outperform only searching for the minimal retail price or only doing bundle search. 
Also, buyers participate in buyer coalition formation more often when the discount policy 
requires more cost. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This dissertation studies the problems of distributed task and resource allocation 
among self-interested agents in virtual organizations. The developed solutions are not 
allocation mechanisms that can be imposed by a centralized designer but decentralized 
interaction mechanisms that provide incentives to self-interested agents to behave 
cooperatively in a multiagent system. Besides incentive compatibility, these mechanisms 
also take computational tractability into consideration due to the inherent complexity of 
distributed task and resource allocation problems. The virtual organizations are not 
established through centralized administrative regulations but formed through the 
interaction among self-interested agents. The developed mechanisms can easily be 
implemented in autonomous agent systems. These decentralized task and resource 
allocation mechanisms can eventually make automated resource management in virtual 
organizations a reality. 
During the last decade, researchers in distributed artificial intelligence endeavored 
to establish theoretic models that can address incentive compatibility and computational 
tractability together when evaluating interaction mechanisms among self-interested agents 
in multiagent systems. Their approaches are normally developing theoretic models that 
consider both the classic game-theoretic solution concepts for noncooperative games and 
computational complexity analysis. Typical example problems of these theoretic models 
are distributed task and resource allocation problems. However, little work has focused on 
developing practical solutions for those problems. This dissertation applies these models to 
 127 
formalizing the distributed task and resource allocation problems that have a variety of 
applications in grid and peer-to-peer computing, electronic commerce and virtual 
organizations. The developed solutions for these problems are decentralized interaction 
mechanisms among self-interested agents that can lead to global task allocation efficiency 
in a multiagent system or stable resource sharing virtual communities based on agents’ own 
decisions on whether or not to behave cooperatively. This dissertation contributes to the 
following research areas in multiagent systems: synthetic task allocation, decentralized 
coalition formation and automated multiparty negotiation. 
 
SYNTHETIC TASK ALLOCATION 
 
This dissertation presents two incentive compatible mechanisms for synthetic task 
allocation problems in which each task needs to be accomplished by a virtual team 
composed of self-interested agents from different real organizations. Compared with 
traditional task allocation problems (Zweben and Fox 1994; Clearwater 1996), the synthetic 
task allocation needs to consider both individual efficiency and team efficiency. The 
participating agents have different owners and are designed by different designers. Agents 
who have tasks that need to be accomplished have no authority to force task-executing 
agents to disclose their true capabilities. Providing incentives to task executing agents to 
report their true capabilities is the key for developing efficient synthetic task allocation 
mechanisms.  
My approach is to formalize the synthetic task allocation problems as an 
algorithmic mechanism design optimization problem. I have developed two incentive 
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compatible mechanisms for the synthetic task allocation problem. The MinTeamwork is n-
approximation mechanism and a strongly truthful implementation for monotonic teamwork. 
Through changing the valuation function and having a more restrictive assumption, the 
MinCompletion mechanism is a truthful implementation with 2-approximation for strongly 
monotonic teamwork. It shows that designing both incentive compatible and 
computationally tractable mechanisms is feasible for synthetic task allocation problems in 
virtual organizations. 
 
DECENTRALIZED COALITION FORMATION  
 
The inherent complexity of coalition formation among self-interested agents makes 
the traditional centralized approaches for coalition formation computationally intractable. 
Another major contribution of this dissertation is developing a decentralized coalition 
formation mechanism that is based on explicit negotiation among self-interested agents. 
Compared with the centralized approaches, the developed mechanism significantly reduces 
the computational cost of the coalition formation process. The communication cost caused 
by negotiation processes is low due to the properly designed multiparty negotiation 
protocol. Each agent makes its own decisions about whether or not to join a possible 
coalition. The resulting coalitions are stable in the core in terms of coalition rationality.  
I have applied this mechanism to form resource sharing coalitions in computational 
grids and to form buyer coalitions in electronic markets. The simulation results show that 
the coalition formation process is successful in the sense that explicit negotiation processes 
can lead agents to find the appropriate coalitions and that a coalition formation process can 
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end properly. The communication load increases almost linearly with the total number of 
agents. Particularly, the simulation results reflect that self-interests can still lead to resource 
sharing in computational grids. This invalidates the need to assume that agents are 
cooperative in the existing systems.  For buyer coalition formation, my distributed coalition 
formation mechanism can result in nearly optimal cost savings. 
 
AUTOMATED MULTIPARTY NEGOTIATION 
 
The multiparty negotiation mechanism in the decentralized coalition formation 
mechanism is itself a very unique contribution of this dissertation.  
In this negotiation mechanism, the negotiation protocol is designed to allow 
multiple agents to make agreements among multiple choices. An agent’s decision about 
whether or not to accept an offer may not only depend on the decisions of other members in 
a proposed coalition but may also depend on the decisions of agents outside of the proposed 
coalition. The negotiation protocol also includes a conflict handling method that can detect 
and break deadlocks caused by parallel negotiation processes. The simulations show that 
the negotiation protocol can conduct the negotiation processes properly. 
 
FUTURE APPLICATIONS 
 
Designing both incentive compatible and computationally tractable mechanisms for 
distributed task and resource allocation among self-interested agents is one of the most 
difficult and important themes in multiagent systems. It is essential to realizing a world 
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where the aggregate power on the Internet will be optimally and dynamically allocated 
online to appropriate users. The methods we described can be applied in either of the 
following two ways toward this vision. 
 
Resource Management in Virtual Organizations 
 
Little is known about how to run a virtual organization efficiently. There does not 
exist a well-understood organizational structure that can represent a virtual organization 
(Hatch 2005). There are many open problems and new research directions. The techniques 
developed in this dissertation can be adapted to perform resource management in virtual 
organizations. The allocation of proper resources to proper tasks so that the global 
performance of a virtual organization can be maximized even if the participating agents are 
self-interested. This will require improving the current task and resource allocation 
mechanisms for more complex scenarios and embedding those mechanisms into existing 
systems such as computational grids, wireless sensor network and supply chain 
management in electronic commerce.  
 
Task and Resource Allocation in Scalable Multiagent Systems 
 
One of the major research trends in multiagent systems is to make systems open and 
scalable. Decentralized task and resource allocation in such a system is highly non-trivial 
because the system dynamically changes and the scalability invalidates effective 
communication among agents. How to get self-interested agents to behave cooperatively so 
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that a global efficiency is achieved by the local decision of each participating agents is the 
key issue for task and resource allocation in open and scalable multiagent systems.  I 
believe that the decentralized allocation mechanisms presented in this dissertation have laid 
a foundation for overcoming this challenge in the future. 
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